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MULTILEVEL GOVERNMENTAL EFFORTS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY: 
POLICY ADOPTION, IMPLEMENATION, AND EVALUATINO UNDER THE 
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT (ARRA) 
 
TAEKYOUN LIM  
 
ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation consists of three essays studying the impact of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act in the energy policy field. The purpose of this research 
was to evaluate the effectiveness of ARRA funds, spent as temporary funding, on the 
change of energy efficiency policies, jobs, and technologies.   
 The first essay examined variation in local level energy-efficiency grants and 
corresponding initiatives from American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) in the 
United States. The analysis was based upon a hurdle model of counts of energy-
efficiency grants received by 348 local governments that received these grants from 2009 
to 2013, as well as 348 matched local governments that did not receive such funds.  City-
level characteristics including amount of federal financial support, per capita income, 
signaling of preferences for sustainability policies, manufacturing and political influences 
were shown to be empirically important determinants of variation in local energy-
efficiency initiatives.  The evidence suggested that all else held equal, the $21.8 billion in 
ARRA funds expended with the intent of promoting the diffusion of local energy-
efficiency programs and policies successfully led to this end.    
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 The second essay examined the impact of the ARRA funds allocated through an 
intergovernmental grant provision under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy (EERE) of the Department of Energy.  The purpose of the second essay was to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the large-scale federal ARRA grant provision implemented 
under the EERE on job creation related to energy efficiency and renewable energy at the 
sub-national level. In doing so, it focuses on whether federal ARRA investments, 
designed to spur the U.S. economy through establishing an innovative energy 
technologies in intergovernmental grant programs for state and local government, 
effectively achieved their stated objectives of increasing job.  Using the first difference 
regression model with instrumental variables, the second essay examined the effects of 
federal ARRA expenditures on job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sectors from 2005 to 2015. The evidence suggests that all else held equal, the 
ARRA funds, implemented through the intergovernmental grant programs, successfully 
led to job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors . The evidence 
suggested that ARRA funds led to a productive cumulative return on job creation in 
energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors during the period of ARRA.  
 The third essay analyzed whether federal ARRA investments, designed to spur 
new energy technologies in grant programs for state and local government, effectively 
achieved their stated objectives.  The analysis was based upon a first difference 
regression model with instrumental variables. This essay examined the effects of federal 
ARRA expenditures on innovation activities in energy technologies from 2005 to 2015. 
The evidence suggests that all else held equal, the ARRA funds, implemented under the 
decentralized networks, successfully stimulated innovative activities in energy 
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technologies. Results also showed that ARRA funds led to productive cumulative return 
on innovation activities toward alternative energy technologies and energy conservation 
technologies during the ARRA period.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 On February 17, 2009 President Barack Obama signed the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) into law. The ARRA was a single-shot game allocated in 
short period of time and as a one-time grant program to support national economic 
recovery during the Great Recession. It included explicit goals for stimulating the 
economy through new job and technology development in health care, sustainable energy 
production and transmission, and improvements to federal and local facilities and 
infrastructure. The purpose of ARRA was to: 
“(A) Preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery  
 (B) Assist those most impacted by the recession 
 (C) Provide investments needed to increase economic efficiency by spurring 
technological advances in science and health 
 (D) Invest in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure 
that will provide long-term economic benefits 
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 (E) Stabilize state and local government budgets, in order to minimize and avoid 
reductions in essential services and counterproductive state and local tax 
increases”1   
 The ARRA relied heavily on instruments of networked governance system. Under 
the ARRA implementation, federal managers were dependent upon local networks to 
achieve national policy outcomes. Federal officials were also consigned to work within a 
networked governance system through existing networks of state, local, nonprofit, and 
business actors in order to accomplish program goals and provide needed services.  The 
ARRA mandated unprecedented transparency for designated expenditures by state and 
local governments, nonprofit organizations, and private contractors, to spend stimulus 
funds as quickly as possible. Energy policy under the ARRA funds had also tended to 
focus on the local ground-level aspects of service delivery. Each state government 
decided how to allocate its share of the funding to local governments as well as non-
governmental entities. State and local governments had fragmented and independent 
authority to craft their actions to match each of their unique circumstances. Overall, the 
subsidies from ARRA funds did not change hierarchically-oriented federal, state and 
local relationships, but, they did have the networked governance system for stimulating 
collaboration between state and local government as well as federal and local 
governments.  
 The ARRA had been emphasized in implementation shifted from ‘government’ to 
‘networked governance’ in achieving public goals (Conlan et al., 207). In the public 
                                                          
1    Public Law 111-5, it was goals cited as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  
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administration studies, networked governance is a concept that tries generally to capture 
the blurring of boundaries between the public and private sectors, and the rise of multi-
sector networks and partnerships in implementing public sector policies and programs 
(Frederickson, 1997; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Stoker, 1998). Related to the notion of 
networked governance are the market-oriented challenges to the traditional bureaucratic 
model of public administration embodied in the New Public Management (NPM) 
(Morgan, 2010). This concept emphasizes values such as flexibility and competition 
(Kaboolian, 1998). Blair (2000) suggests that decreased federal involvement and support 
forces states and local in the United Sates to be more creative and innovative in devising, 
organizing, financing, and implementing these types of activities. In the literature on 
networked governance, scholars have long recognized many issues of the actual effects of 
networked governance within the process of engaging various public and private agencies 
in the implementation of government programs.  For example, Robert Agranoff and 
Michael McGuire (2003) have investigated the role of networks in local public and 
nonprofit service delivery arrangement. They provided valuable lessons about the 
effectiveness of networks which launched a more sophisticated discussion of the roles 
that various actors, including public managers, play in local, community-based initiative. 
McGuire (2000) also offered limited evidence that the presence of innovative governance 
system might induce higher levels of collaboration in cities. Posner (2013) mentioned 
that these approaches pose uniquely difficult challenges for both accountability and 
performance in federal programs.   
 Consequently, the ARRA provided an ideal testing ground for exploring the 
federal role in diffuse policy implementation networks (Conlan et al., 2017). However, no 
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published research has yet examined empirically the effectiveness of the networked 
governance system in the implementation of the American Recovery Reinvestment Act. 
Furthermore, the policy literature lacks compelling evidence of the effectiveness of the 
networked governance tools that were used at the energy policy under the ARRA. 
Accordingly, this dissertation has tended to focus on the effectiveness of energy policies 
implemented under the networked governance system in a three-essay format. 
Specifically, each essay of this dissertation focused on the energy efficiency grants were 
used as a tool of networked governance within the context of mutual relationships among 
federal, state, and local governments.   
 This three-essay dissertation seeks to contribute empirical insights in terms of a 
set of broader conceptual frameworks that are inherently related but remain disconnected 
in the scholarly literature, and concurrently advance policy knowledge about the effects 
of American Recovery Reinvestment Act within the energy sector. Specifically, this 
dissertation was grounded in the networked governance framework as a commonalities 
between three essays into the context of evaluating ARRA expenditure for energy. It was 
intended to serve as a step toward evaluating how well the governments was achieving its 
statutory mission and goals, what have we learned about the Recovery Act, and what the 
discrepancy was between public perceptions of governmental performance and realities 
on the ground. All three essays contain empirical analyses focused on the local and state 
ground-level evaluative aspects of whether ARRA funds effectively achieved their stated 
objectives. The research approach of each essay was tailored to its guiding research 
question and the inherent limitations of the available secondary data. Particular attention 
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is given to the selection and application of each empirical model in an effort to maximize 
the statistical and external validity of the combined analysis.  
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The first essay examined the impact of the ARRA energy funding on local 
government energy-efficiency programs and policies. The following specific questions 
were considered. Under what general circumstances, if any, were more energy-efficiency 
grants received and initiatives taken at the local government level? What factors explain 
variation in ARRA stimulated energy efficiency activity at the local governmental level?  
 The system for making and obtaining local energy efficiency grants from ARRA 
funds did not change the usual, top-down, hierarchically-oriented federal-state-local 
relationships. They have a somewhat unique structure in that local government were 
required to take self-initiative to compete within the federal funding process. This essay 
primarily focused on the effects of the ARRA funds supported through the six programs 
used a competitive process for making their awards: (1) Energy-efficiency and 
 
Impact of the ARRA 
funds on the innovative 
activities in the categories 
of alternative energy 
production and energy 
conservation   
 
Impact of the ARRA 
funds on the adoption of 
local energy efficiency 
programs                    
 
Essay 1 
ARRA under Networked Governance 
 
Impact of the ARRA 
funds on the job creation 
counted in the categories 
of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy   
Essay 2 Essay 3 
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Conservation Block Grants; (2) State Energy Program; (3) Weatherization Assistance 
Program; (4) Energy Efficient Appliance Rebated Program; (5) Energy Assurance and 
Planning Program; (6) Energy-efficiency and Renewable Energy Program.  
 To determine whether, on the margin, ARRA energy funding affected the 
numbers of local government energy efficiency grants received, and programs and 
policies adopted, the empirical model was tested based first upon propensity score 
matching to identify a set of cities as similar as possible to those that received the funds, 
except that they did not receive any such funds. Then a hurdle model was used to predict 
the number of ARRA energy efficiency grants, using controls for the similar cities.  The 
analysis was based upon a hurdle model of counts of energy efficiency grants received by 
348 local governments that received these grants from 2009 to 2013, as well as 348 
otherwise similar local governments that did not receive such funds. 
 This essay showed that the $21.8 billion in ARRA funds expended with the state 
intent of improving energy efficiency did indeed stimulate the sought for energy 
efficiency initiatives, and adoption of local energy efficiency programs and policies.  
Model results reveal that the competitive process for acquiring ARRA grants at the local 
level seems to have been an effective mechanism for the diffusion of more energy 
efficiency programs and policies, at least in the short term. Model results demonstrated 
that city level characteristics including the land size, per capita income, signaling of 
preferences for sustainability policies, manufacturing and political influences were 
empirically important determinants of variation in local energy efficiency initiatives. The 
empirical results indicates, however, that although one-shot federal spending may not be 
optimal for achieving longer term improvements, the short term expenditures led to 
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effective performance in terms of promoting the diffusion of energy efficiency policies, 
at least in the short term and at the local level.  
 Job creation was the primary goal of the Obama administration’s American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The second essay focused on how the ARRA 
funds had performed in creating jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy 
sector. This essay evaluated the effectiveness of ARRA funds with an empirical 
assessment of the relationship between the total amounts allocated through 
intergovernmental grant provision under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy (EERE) of Department of Energy (DOE) and the number of jobs counted in 
energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors. The primary research question of this 
essay was as follows: what factors influence the success of the implementation of federal 
ARRA-related energy policies at the state government level? This essay framed a 
conceptual definition of successful implementation by assessing whether the desired 
results were met. This essay focused on whether this implementation under the Recovery 
Act achieved job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors. The jobs 
in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector, were estimated both in terms of (1) 
energy efficiency, and (2) energy renewable sources sub-categorized in the category of 
“Green Goods and Services (GGS)” defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). 
 The second essay tested whether the ARRA expenditure, as a one-time event, led 
to a spike in job creation in the energy sector or whether it has long-term impacts on job 
creation. This research used panel data of 49 states in the U.S. over the period of 2005-
2015. For instance, this study also included lagged variables for the ARRA expenditure 
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allocated in selected energy programs in order to capture any lagged effects of the ARRA 
funds in the previous year.  To control for remaining omitted variable bias, this research 
used instrumental variables for the ARRA expenditure on selected grant programs. Thus, 
the second essay used two-stage models: this research conducted the first difference 
analysis with instrumental variables approach to consider the assumption for the 
endogeneity of the ARRA funds.  This analysis was approached in first-difference two-
stage least squares (FD2SLS) estimation to control the assumption that lagged ARRA 
variables may be correlated with the error term.  
 The second essay confirmed that cumulated ARRA expenditure made in 
intergovernmental grant programs through the EERE led to higher levels of job creation 
in energy efficiency, and renewable energy sectors. These positive impact of the 
temporary ARRA funding may be impacted by the intergovernmental grant process. The 
intergovernmental grants funded by the ARRA were designed to distribute funds to state 
or local governments so that they could quickly spend on projects that would create jobs 
and foster growth in their communities (Terman & Feiock, 2012).  The second essay’s 
empirical results showed that government funds implemented under these 
intergovernmental grants process had positive impacts in short term to stimulate 
employment in energy efficiency, and renewable energy sectors.    
 The third essay examined the determinants of the innovative activities included in 
the categories of alternative energy production and energy conservation. This essay was 
focused on whether federal ARRA investments, designed to spur new technologies 
designed to improve alternative energy and energy conservation effectively achieved 
their stated objectives.  The major purpose of this essay was to evaluate the effectiveness 
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of the ARRA funds, spent in grants at the state and local governments through 
Department of Energy, on innovative activities in energy technologies. Counts of patent 
application were used as proxies for innovative activities instead of patent publication 
measured as innovation output. Although patent applications may not translate into 
practice, their counts have the potential for most accurately representing the outcomes for 
technological innovative activities (Johnstone et al., 2009). Relevant patent applications 
were measured at the individual patent level, with using codes issued by the USPTO’s 
Green Technology Pilot Program. 
 In this vein of inquiry, I conducted the first differenced analysis with instrumental 
variables approach so as to appropriately consider the endogeneity of the ARRA funds.  
The research included years both before and after ARRA from 2005 to 2015 to observe 
the impact of ARRA funds. This research evaluated the effectiveness of ARRA 
expenditures as measured by total amount spent in seven grant programs aimed to 
promote upgraded energy efficiency technologies under the DOE’s Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). These seven grant programs account for the 
vast majority if not all of the ARRA expenditures made for improving energy efficiency 
and greenness. Also, this research included two instrumental variables that did not enable 
energy technologies’ innovation or promotion, but that may correlated with the level of 
the allocated ARRA-Energy funds. As instrumental variables, I used the unemployment 
rates and the total amount of ARRA funds spent under block grants based upon the 
results of the validity of instrumental variables.  
 The results of this analysis demonstrate that ARRA expenditures spent in the 
seven grant programs through the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
10 
 
(EERE) led to significantly higher levels of innovation activities in energy technologies 
in states in individual years. After one year of ARRA expenses, the ARRA funds under 
the EERE led to significant and positive impacts on innovative activities in the 
technologies of the alternative energy and the energy conservation, as well as combined 
categories. However, after two years of ARRA expenses, the dollar amount of ARRA 
funds under the EERE led to significantly negative impacts on innovation activities only 
for the conservation energy technologies. Again, in three years after, the ARRA funds 
under the EERE led to significant and positive impacts on the innovative activities in the 
technologies of alternative energy and energy conservation as well as both categories. 
 The third essay concluded that innovation activities were strongly associated with 
lagged long-run (delayed) effects of the government investments. It is very noteworthy 
that temporary government funding evidently played a determinative role in directly 
stimulating more energy technology-related innovative activities, in cumulated returns, at 
the state level. In this perspective, innovative activities may be required extended 
timeframes for their achievement.  Empirical evidence indicated that delayed impact in 
government spending should be considered to see more productive return on their 
investment.  Model results in the third essay also reveal that ARRA funds implemented 
under the decentralized networks had an important impact on innovation activities related 
to energy technologies during the period of the ARRA. It means that state governments 
established their achievement in the program, designed with their authority to meet 
production targets, under the ARRA. These accomplishments have the implication that it 
is important to inject decentralized delivery systems in aspect of how should be able to 
11 
 
design the federal expenditure more efficiently for promoting of innovation activities 
toward energy technologies in the future.  
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CHAPTER II 
DETERMINANTS AND EVALUATION OF LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
INITIATIVES FROM THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 
(ESSAY 1) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was a large-scale short-
term federal initiative passed in 2009 as a Keynesian macroeconomic measure to support 
national economic recovery during the Great Recession.  It included explicit goals for 
stimulating the economy through investment in sustainable energy (Recovery 
Accountability and Transparency Board, 2015).  Unprecedented levels of federal 
expenditures were made to promote advanced, efficient, and clean energy.  The intent of 
the Act included economic stabilization, job creation, job retention and regional wealth 
creation.  The expenditures played a key role in U.S. energy policy, primarily by supporting 
state and local initiatives to adopt programs, policies and practices for purposes of 
sustainable energy (Carley et al., 2014).     
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 The high stakes and speed needed to implement the ARRA and ward off massive 
recession placed a premium on decentralized and often informal collaborative networks of 
people and groups in federal, state and local governments, as well as nonprofit and business 
organizations.  The widespread use of various indirect tools of governance in the Act’s 
implementation, including grants, has raised “several theoretical puzzles” as well as a 
“uniquely informative” opportunity to examine the theory of “how large scale federal 
programs can be effectively implemented and held accountable in an era of indirect and 
networked governance, about how political and governmental institutions respond to large 
doses of fiscal shock therapy, and about the wide discrepancy between public perceptions 
of governmental performance and realities on the ground” (Conlan et al., 2017,  p. 6).  
 In accordance with practices of fiscal federalism, the federal government relied in 
large measure on state and local actors to implement the federal policy goals in the ARRA.  
One way this was done was through enactment of a process in which local actors had a role 
in applying for and receiving new federal grants.  One of the purposes of this essay is to 
help gain a better theoretical understanding of how a set of local factors affected this 
implementation process.  An open question in the literature is about the reasons why some 
local actors apply for grants under such new programs while others do not.  While the 
answer to this question remains largely out of reach, it has consequences for both the theory 
and practice of fiscal federalism and for “the achievement of federal goals when the federal 
government has no direct path to implementers and their implementation efforts” (Terman 
& Feiock, 2014, p. 322).  The better understanding I seek is important for purposes of 
helping to identify which public finance functions are best centralized and which are best 
located in more decentralized governmental and other agencies, among other things.   
14 
 
 Although the factors that determine local participation in the implementation of 
federal policy goals have been examined elsewhere in the literature, they have not been 
considered explicitly in regards to whether they influence local actors in terms of their 
decisions to apply for and receive newly established federal grants.  The energy efficiency 
grants furnished by the federal government under the ARRA are a case in point.  The 
question is: what if any identifiable conditions evoked local participation in achieving 
federal policy goals through these newly established federal grant programs, and what if 
any incentives encouraged local actors to choose to pursue them?  Also, in what extent, if 
any, were these conditions driven by political influences such as party affiliation and 
representation (Inman 1988, Oates 1999, Porto & Sanguinetti 2001)?  In helping to answer 
these questions I also extend the research conversation found in Carley’s (2016) special 
issue of this journal by providing practical insight into some of the details of the successes 
of a range of ARRA expenditures vis-à-vis the experiences of localities in the energy-
efficiency field.  I follow those papers in considering the context of the conditions faced 
by local grant recipients and providing another step toward evaluating “what have we 
learned about the Recovery Act, and what have we learned from the Recovery Act” 
(Carley, 2016a, p.119).   
 Recent research has started to examine the actual effects of energy-related ARRA 
expenditures.  Some has looked at how state capacity affected funding of energy programs 
(Carley et al., 2014; Terman & Feiock, 2014a; Terman, 2015; Terman et al., 2016). Other 
focused on assessment of the experiences of a range of national actors during the ARRA 
period (Tonn et al., 2016; Carley, 2016).  Still other examined the effectiveness of related 
intergovernmental grant management or collaborative contract management (Terman & 
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Feiock, 2016; Lachezar, 2016). However, although the literature provides good reason to 
expect that the ARRA energy-efficiency expenditures substantially influenced levels of 
local government energy activities, no published research has yet examined the 
determinants of local-level success in the process of competing for ARRA energy-
efficiency grants.  Neither has any study provided an overview in terms of the implications 
of the ARRA expenditures for the future of federally funded sustainable energy-efficiency 
programs and policies.  Accordingly, this research examined the impact of ARRA energy 
funding on local government energy-efficiency programs and policies. The following 
specific questions were considered.  Under what general circumstances, if any, were more 
energy-efficiency grants received and initiatives taken at the local government level?  What 
factors explain variation in ARRA stimulated energy-efficiency activity at the local 
governmental level?  These are answered first through a review of the relevant literature 
and then through a quasi-experiment and a hurdle model designed to be as parsimonious, 
plausible, and informative as possible. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Fiscal Federalism and Local Energy Policy Adoption 
 The fiscal federalism literature focuses, among other things, upon the relationship 
between federal and subnational governments. A main assumption is that the federal 
government plays the role of establishing a comprehensive framework and local 
governments then implement their own programs for meeting the performance targets 
written into federal goal statements (Rabe, 2011).  The preferences held by federal and 
local governments are assumed to be aligned (Nicholson-Crotty, 2008) and federal policies 
are assumed to be designed to integrate all levels of government, including state and local 
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(Handley, 2008). Furthermore, it is assumed that this alignment and integration may be 
accomplished through intergovernmental grants to state and local governments and other 
activities in a manner that conforms to federal policy goals (Mueller, 2003).  Local 
government is thus viewed as a subnational extension of the national government, with key 
roles in the production, provision and delivery of public services (Cho, 2005).  
 The grants and initiatives investigated in this research were funded by the ARRA 
through the US Department of Energy from 2009 – 2013.  They went directly to local 
agencies so that they could quickly be spent on programs, projects and policies that would 
foster growth in their communities (Terman & Feiock, 2014a).2   Table 1 shows the six 
categories of ARRA funded grant programs included in this research.  
Table 1. Categories of Energy-efficiency Projects funded under the Department of 
Energy’s ARRA 
 
 
 
 
Office of Energy-
Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy 
 
 
 
 
Categories of 
Energy-efficiency 
Projects 
 
 Energy-efficiency and Conservation Block 
Grants 
 State Energy  Program 
 Weatherization Assistance Program 
 Energy Efficient Appliance Rebated 
Program 
 Energy Assurance and Planning program 
 Energy-efficiency and Renewable Energy 
Program 
 
Source: Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board. 2015  
 
  For the most part, the system for making and obtaining the new local energy-
efficiency grants from ARRA funds did not change the usual, top-down, hierarchically-
                                                          
2   Some funds were awarded directly to local government by the federal government on a competitive 
basis. Others passed through state government to local government in accordance with the guidelines of the 
federal governments, still on a competitive basis. 
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oriented federal-state-local relationships.  But they did have a somewhat unique structure 
in that local governments were required to take self-initiative to compete within the federal 
funding process (Conlan et al., 2017, p.75).  Specifically, the grant programs with this 
structure included the Energy-efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG) funds, 
for which the expressly stated intent was to make federal funds available locally for 
purposes of supporting sustainable energy initiatives.  The EECBG program directly 
funded 59% of the total ARRA energy-related funding allocated by the federal government 
at the city level (DOE, 2011).  The other major set of such expenditures were those made 
under the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP).  Expenditures for the WAP 
accounted for 30% of the total amount of ARRA energy related funding allocated by the 
federal government at the local level (Sissine, 2012).  Terman and Feiock (2012) remarked 
that such direct local expenditures were the most straightforward possible mechanism to 
accomplish both federal and local energy sustainability goals while bringing better 
adoptability and responsibility as well as a reduction in bureaucratic redundancy and cost 
(Terman & Feiock, 2014a).   
 ARRA directed EECBG and WAP grants to local governments based upon the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The EECBG program specifically 
provided “non-entitlement cities” with the opportunity to compete for funds for energy-
efficiency improvements.  These were cities not officially designated by the federal 
government as being among the largest in each state.  Although most federal funds under 
the WAP were awarded in the form of formula grants, some were provided to non-
entitlement cities in the form of competitive funding through categorical formula grants.  
These competitive grants were designated for programs that disbursed and managed 
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activities for upgrading heating and air conditioning equipment, and implemented other 
energy conservation measures (Conlan et al., 2017, p109). Special targets for WAP 
assistance included energy-efficiency initiatives for the low-income elderly, disabled, and 
families with children, all of which were handled by the US Department of Energy (DOE).  
The DOE made grants to state governments, which then passed the funding through to 
competitively successful local governments, nonprofits, as well as public community 
agencies that oversaw the weatherization work. State governments relied on existing local 
agencies to implement WAP under the ARRA; local agencies were hired through a 
competitive bidding process (Conlan et al., 2017, p.122).  Similarly, funds allocated 
through the Energy-efficiency and Renewable Energy Program (EERE) also used a 
partially competitive process through categorical grants for making awards.  The 
application processes were available for local governments, as well as private entities and 
nonprofit organizations. The Energy Efficient Appliance Rebated Program (EEARP), the 
Energy Assurance and Planning Program (EAPP), and the State Energy Program (SEP) 
also dedicated a portion of their funding temporary to provide competitively awarded 
financial assistance over the ARRA period (Goldman, 2011).  
 Expenditures under all of these programs were uniform in the sense that when 
allocating funds, federal policy makers used standard criteria and language that were 
consistently applied across places without any sort of explicit, place-specific criteria 
written into them.  For instance, they required, without respect to any considerations of the 
circumstances of any particular locale, demonstration that, in general, only those locales 
with capacity to expend funds effectively could receive them.  But they did not provide a 
list or otherwise enumerate any sort of determination as to whether or not any particular 
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locale had such capacity.  Rather, it was up to the particular locale to make its own case for 
its own capacity.  Thus, the statements of uniform federal policy goals were blind to the 
particular circumstances of local governments, even though some of these local 
circumstances played a crucial role in determining levels of policy adoption (Handley, 
2008; Wheeler, 2008).   
 Local governments have a wide range of different characteristics, capacities and 
preferences, and they face a range of regional economic, social and historically contingent 
circumstances which differentially affected the likelihood that they might adopt and 
implement federally funded energy-efficiency programs.  Moreover, as is recognized by a 
growing body of literature, all of these ideographic factors must be identified and 
systematically considered if one is to convincingly establish the impact of federal 
expenditures at the local level (Lyon & Yin, 2010; Sapat, 2004; Sharp et al., 2010; Portney, 
2003; Feiock et al., 2010).  Accordingly, a number of such factors have been identified, as 
described in the following subsections.   
Federal Financial Support  
 Evidence indicates that the levels of available fiscal resources affect magnitudes of 
state and local energy initiatives.  Clark and Whitford (2011) investigated the effects of 
grants provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at the state level, 
finding evidence for a “flypaper effect” in which the more money a state received from the 
federal government, the more opportunity it had to apply those funds to more programs.  
States with greater fiscal resources thus had more environmental policies.  Similarly Krause 
(2011), while investigating the factors that explain variation in policy adoption at the local 
level, found that higher levels of per capita general revenue in a given city tended to 
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motivate more climate-related initiatives and policies.  Wang (2009) showed that 
California cities’ climate actions were influenced by fiscal capacity.  Hawkins et al. (2017) 
tested the hypothesis that cities with higher levels of own source revenue are more likely 
to invest in financial capacities that are intended to support sustainability, finding evidence 
that the relationship between local fiscal capacity and commitment for sustainability 
priorities is nonlinear.  Accordingly, I hypothesized that cities that received more energy-
related ARRA funds would undertake more energy-efficiency initiative and adopted more 
related policies and programs. 
Economic and Demographic Characteristics 
 All ARRA funds were delivered to cities of more than 50,000 population and their 
adjacent urbanized clusters of at least 2,500 and less than 50,000 people.  Previous 
research has shown that a number of city-specific characteristics are relevant at this level 
in determining more local energy initiatives. 
 The first such characteristic is city size. Lubell et al. (2009) found that increased 
city size, measured in terms of land area, tended to increase the level of activity for 
sustainable use of energy. In particular, cities with larger land size tended to adopt more 
energy-efficiency programs and policies.  
 Secondly, as a rule, the invention, commercialization, and adoption of energy-
efficiency practices and energy saving technology requires a significant investment (Koski 
& Lee, 2014; Sharp, Daley, & Lynch, 2010; Lyon & Yin, 2010).  Previous studies have 
thus examined whether per capita income is associated with variation in levels of energy 
efficiency initiative.  The prevailing theory has been that people with lower-incomes are 
less likely to be able to afford programs and policies oriented around energy-efficiency 
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technologies, so innovative energy technologies are more likely to emerge and diffuse from 
within cities with higher income levels.  In this case, however, given that WAP grants in 
particular were intended to subsidize weatherization of the homes of primarily low-to-
moderate-income households, I expected that cities with higher per capita income would 
adopt fewer energy-efficiency policy programs.  
 Thirdly, previously published research suggests that the size of the population 
influences energy efficiency initiatives, programs and policies.  Less populated, sprawled 
cities tend to be less energy-efficient (Balbo, 1993).  On the other hand, higher urban 
populations tend to present more opportunities for increases in energy-efficiency 
attributable to their greater dependency on commercial products and services relative to 
rural populations (Clancy, Maduka, & Lumampoa, 2008).  More highly populated cities 
with greater concentrations of human resources and economic activities also tend to have 
correspondingly greater energy demand, largely attributable to the corresponding demand 
for urban infrastructure and greater energy consumption (Madlener & Sunak, 2011).  
Evidence furthermore suggests that urbanization leads to economies of scale which provide 
opportunities for increases in energy-efficiency (Sadorsky, 2013).  Population-related 
patterns such as these seem likely to place policy makers in more highly populated urban 
communities in circumstances in which they must concentrate more on both energy-
efficiency and related pollutant emissions.  Therefore I expected that cities with a greater 
population would take more energy-efficiency initiatives and receive correspondingly 
more grants.   
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Preference for Energy-efficiency Policies  
 Several studies have examined the relationship between policy preferences and 
policy choice.  Some city governments prefer relatively more stringent policies and 
standards for achieving reductions in GHG emissions and enhancing sustainability.  One 
indicator of this is membership in the International Council for Local Environmental 
Initiatives (ICLEI) (Krause, 2010; Yi & Krause, 2017).  ICLEI membership obliges cities 
to participate in programs for sustainability, achievement toward innovative environmental 
governance, and clean energy-efficiency (Yi & Krause, 2017).  Such preference has been 
shown to correlate with the institutionalization of sustainability programs in specialized 
units within local governments (Kwon, Jang, & Feiock 2014, Sharp et al., 2010).  Thus I 
anticipated that, all else equal, ICLEI member cities would have taken more initiative and 
established more energy-efficiency programs and policies relative to non-ICLEI cities.  
 Local government participation in climate protection initiatives is likely to signal 
an interest in energy-efficiency, and therefore to predict the decision to compete for ARRA 
energy-efficiency grants.  Climate Protection Agreements are developed as part of longer-
term plans to achieve Green House Gas emission reduction and improvements in 
environmental conditions. The presence of these agreements can signal a preference for 
efforts toward sustainable and efficient energy policies. Thus, I expected that cities which 
had signed climate protection agreements would have taken the initiative to obtain more 
ARRA energy-efficiency grants than cities that had not signed them.   
 Variation in levels of education between cities has been shown to influence levels 
of environmental preservation and willingness to embrace and actively support sustainable 
use of energy (Inglehart & Abramson, 1994; O’Connell, 2008; Portney, 2008).  
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Accordingly, I expected cities that have a higher level of education would take more 
initiative and receive more ARRA energy-efficiency grants.   
Manufacturing Influence 
 Following other local environmental policy research (Krause, 2011; Sharp et al, 
2010; Lyon & Yin, 2010, Koski & Lee, 2014), a greater presence of manufacturing firms 
is likely to have the effect of depressing environmental policy actions as a result of their 
tendency to avoid extra costs for energy-efficiency or energy saving. For example, low-
carbon technologies or advanced technologies for clean energy or energy-efficiency, which 
tend to be more expensive than standard technologies, may not be popular, especially for 
older, established manufacturing groups, even though these technologies may contribute 
to a reduction of CO2 emissions. Therefore, I expected that all else held equal, cities with 
a greater presence of manufacturing firms would take fewer energy-efficiency initiatives 
and adopt fewer related programs and policies.   
Political Influence 
 Local governments’ political orientation has been recognized as a factor that affects 
policy adoption. Previous research indicates that cities with an ideology aligned with the 
Democratic Party may be more likely to prefer governmental intervention in environmental 
and sustainable use of energy policy (Lubell et al., 2009). The political circumstance of a 
local government evidently not only affects policy choice, but also policy implementation 
(Peters, 2002). 
 The state’s political orientation is reflected in the preferences of state legislators 
and the nature of the constraints in the policy adoption process (Clark & Whitford, 2011; 
Bressers & O’Toole, 1998). Accordingly, recent studies assessing the effectiveness of 
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energy policies have incorporated variables that represent states’ political circumstances. 
Using the environmental scorecard of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), Delmas 
et al. (2011) for instance found that the presence of a Democratically-controlled state 
government and a majority of Democratic representatives was positively associated with 
the adoption of renewable energy policies and investment in energy infrastructure.  Also 
using the LCV, Shrimali et al. (2015) found that states with more Democratic control 
tended to have a greater collective preference for environmental protection and to have a 
positive and significant correlation with the deployment of wind energy. Other empirical 
studies have also found that states with a higher LCV rating were positively linked to the 
adoption of environmental policies, including energy policies (Clark & Whitford, 2011; 
Carley, 2009; Delmas & Mones-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011).  Therefore, I 
expected to find that cities with high percentage of total votes that supported the 
Democratic candidate are more likely to adopt more energy-efficiency policy programs. 
Government Type 
 In recent research, the direct influence of government structures has started to 
appear to be a significant determinant of local energy-efficiency policies. Typically, the 
form of government consists of either an elected mayor-council structure, with an elected 
mayor as a chief executive, or a council-manager structure, with a professional manager 
hired by the elected council (Svara & Nelson, 2008; Nelson & Svara, 2015). Accordingly, 
Bae and Feiock (2013) found that various forms of government differentially provide 
greater opportunities for cities to engage in joint problem solving and to learn new policy 
approaches to address sustainability actions.  Kwon, Jang, and Feiock (2014) recently 
assessed how government structure affects the adoption of energy policies.  Specifically, 
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they examined 172 California cities to determine the factors that influence the level of 
climate protection and energy sustainability policy action. They hypothesized that cities 
with more political obstacles tended to undertake fewer climate protection and energy 
sustainability policy actions. Specifically, their research suggested that professional city 
managers who, compared to political officials, tend to care more about administrative 
efficiency and productive performance for purposes of raising their personal career 
reputations, may be less motivated to initiate and support environmental protection policies 
directed to the community rather than governmental operations. On the other hand elected 
mayors, who tend to be more concerned about issues of political responsiveness and 
representation, were evidently more interested in taking climate protection and energy 
sustainability policy actions in order to attract electoral support from environmental interest 
groups in their community.   
 Kwon, Jang, and Feiock (2014) also analyzed survey data obtained from 8,569 local 
governments in the United States in 2010, and concluded that a mayor-council form of 
government takes 1.32 times more environmental conservation actions than cities without 
this form.  Similarly, Nelson and Svara (2015) found support for their conjecture that local 
administrators tend to concentrate on their expertise rather than seeking diverse 
opportunities in the adoption of public policy, and that they prefer to maintain a neutral 
stand on controversial issues. If an issue causes a dichotomy of opinion between politicians 
and administrators, such as energy-efficiency policies are likely to do, administrators are 
less likely to adopt the policy, even though they are active in policy formulation. Deslatte 
et al. (2017) found strong support for the influence of council-manager government on 
sustainable policy innovation. Therefore, I expected to find that cities with a mayor-council 
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form of government would take more energy-efficiency initiatives, receive more ARRA 
grants, and start more related programs and policies.  
Research Methods 
 A major purpose of this research was to examine the determinants of ARRA funds 
in the competitive selection processes for energy-efficiency grants, along with their 
associated activities, programs and policies.  I tested hypotheses about the previously 
mentioned variables using a quasi-experimental design based first upon propensity score 
matching to identify a set of cities similar to those that received the funds, except that they 
did not receive any such funds (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983; Dehejia & Wabha 2002). Then 
I calibrated a hurdle model that predicted the number of ARRA energy-efficiency grants 
on the basis of the previously considered variables, using controls for the similar cities.  
 To identify a set of cities similar to the 348 cities that received energy-efficiency 
related ARRA funds, except that they did not receive such funds, I retrieved all of the 
10,849 cities with a FIPS code assigned by the U.S. Census Bureau from American Fact 
Finder. Prior to matching the observations were stratified by the four census regions: 
Northeast, Midwest, South and West.  Cities were matched with others in the same census 
region on the basis of population density, since this was significantly correlated with the 
outcome variable but not with the set of independent variables in the model (Sadorsky, 
2013; Balbo, 1993).  The matching process used 1:1 nearest neighbor matching with 
replacement, matching cities by the nearest available propensity score (Dehejia & Wahba, 
2002).3  A summary description of the resulting balance of the cities is provided in Table 
                                                          
3  Specifically, at each stage (a) one of the cities that had received ARRA funds was selected from a 
randomly ordered list of cities in both categories, (b) a city with the closest propensity score was identified 
and a match made, (c) the matched pair was removed from the pool, (d) the city that did not receive ARRA 
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2.  Hotelling’s T test results indicated no significant differences in the covariates between 
the two groups of cities.   
Table 2. Summary of Balancing Test 
Census 
Region 
Matching Variables Treatment Comparison F-value P-value 
Northeast Population Density 2009 6620.356 6229.101 0.175 0.676 
Population Density 2010 6696.430 9285.100 0.182 0.671 
Population Density 2011 6632.067 6238.099 0.176 0.676 
Population Density 2012 6636.477 6336.477 0.170 0.681 
Population Density 2013 6791.341 6378.457 0.161 0.689 
Midwest Population Density 2009 3432.400 3430.351 0.000 0.998 
Population Density 2010 3441.794 3433.272 0.000 0.992 
Population Density 2011 3484.592 3436.644 0.003 0.955 
Population Density 2012 3495.893 3456.293 0.001 0.972 
Population Density 2013 3505.044 3474.742 0.000 0.990 
South Population Density 2009 2912.390 2917.936 0.000 0.995 
Population Density 2010 2925.729 2926.130 0.000 0.999 
Population Density 2011 2965.861 2959.9369 0.000 0.997 
Population Density 2012 6052.481 3028.225 0.000 0.983 
Population Density 2013 3052.481 3028.225 0.000 0.983 
West Population Density 2009 3121.486 3123.465 0.000 0.993 
Population Density 2010 3127.324 3128.982 0.000 0.994 
Population Density 2011 3158.631 3155.977 0.000 0.985 
Population Density 2012 3189.853 3182.304 0.002 0.968 
Population Density 2013 3223.113 3208.089 0.001 0.970 
Note: the p-value of the test indicated that the matched the pairs are balanced at 5% level.  
 
Conceptual Model   
 To determine whether, on the margin, ARRA energy funding affected the numbers 
of local government energy-efficiency grants received, and programs and policies adopted, 
all of the previously mentioned factors had to be statistically considered.  This was done 
using a hurdle model, first with a conditional logistic model to control for any differences 
                                                          
funds was put back in to the pool, and (e) the process was repeated with the next city until all 348 cities had 
a pair. 
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between cities that applied and received ARRA energy-efficiency grants and those that 
could not or did not do so.  Second, it used a Poisson count model truncated at zero to 
estimate the effect of the covariates on the number of grants received by the recipient cities.  
The analysis thus assumed an underlying process with two stages. The first stage generated 
whether or not a city applied for and received and energy-efficiency grant and the second 
generated the number of such grants received by the recipient cities; 
Prob (Yi = 0) = fi (0) 
Prob (Yi = j) = 
1−𝑓i(0)
1−𝑝i(0)
  Pi (j), j=1, 2,…60 
where fi(0) is the probability of the zero outcome, Pi(j) is the probability of the non-zero 
outcomes conditioned on the outcome being greater than zero. Here, i represent the cities, 
and j represent the number of ARRA energy-efficiency awards.  
 
Data 
Dependent variable 
 The dependent variable reflected the number of energy-efficiency grants received 
at the local level from the six aforementioned ARRA funded programs (see Table 1).  This 
research assumed that ceteris paribus, cities that received more grants undertook more 
activities and made more federally-funded progress in terms of greater energy-efficiency 
relative to those that received fewer grants.  This research included all 348 local 
governments in the 50 states that received federal money for one or more ARRA funded 
projects for each year during the period from 2009 to 2013, as well as 348 additional cities 
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selected through the matching process, as described above, for a total of 3,480 
city/year/grant observations.4   
Independent variables 
 The empirical model represented the factors that, on the basis of previous research, 
might have influenced federal government ARRA expenditures.  See Table 3 for a 
description and the source of each independent variable in the empirical model.  The 
categories of these variables coincided with those considered above, including (1) federal 
financial support, (2) economic and demographical characteristics, (3) preference for 
energy-efficiency policy, (4) manufacturing influence, (5) political influence, (6) 
government’s types, and (7) education attainment.5   
 Financial support by the federal government was measured by total amount of 
federal grants awarded for the six programs under the categories of energy-efficiency 
project between 2009 and 2013. The economic and demographic characteristic variables 
included (a) land size, (b) per capita personal income, and (c) population. Land size 
reflected land area in square miles in the city proper, and population reflected the entire 
corresponding population.  Per capita personal income was in 2013 inflation-adjusted 
dollars. Preferences for energy-efficiency policies reflected whether or not a city was a 
member in good standing of ICLEI-USA in the respective year. Member cities were coded 
‘1’, nonmembers ‘0’. It also reflected whether or not the city’s mayor had singed the 
                                                          
4  The data are available at (http://www.recovery.gov/arra/FAQ/Pages/DownloadCenter.aspx ).  They 
are based on recipient reports made available by the Department of Energy. 
 
5  Two of these variables, population and land size, are time constant in that within any given city they 
change either very slightly, or not at all over the study period.  Tests for pathologies in the error terms of the 
hurdle model, however, indicated that these variables did not produce significant serial autocorrelation in the 
estimates.  
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Climate Protection Agreement by 2009. Signed cities were coded ‘1’, nonmembers ‘0’.  
Next, in regards to the effect of the presence of manufacturing, previous research has 
suggested that states in which manufacturing accounts for a major part of all industrial 
employment and output are less inclined to adopt policies related to clean energy or energy-
efficiency, probably because of an aversion to incurring extra costs (Krause, 2011; Sharp 
et al, 2010; Lyon & Yin, 2010, Koski & Lee, 2014).  Thus, the model included the number 
of establishments within the manufacturing sector in each city. Previous research has also 
shown that the presence of a Democratic governor and a majority Democratic 
representatives are likely to be positively related to the adoption of energy-efficiency 
programs and investment in energy-efficiency infrastructure (Park, 2015; Clark & Whitfor, 
2011).  Thus, the model included the percentage of each city’s total votes that supported 
the Democratic candidate in the 2012 presidential election. The city government type was 
a dummy variable coded ‘1’ for a council-manager structure and ‘0’ for others.  Finally, I 
operationalized educational attainment in terms of the percentage of the population over 
the age of 25 with a BA degree. The analyses also included dummy variables representing 
years, to account for year-specific factors potentially affecting the number of energy 
efficiency initiatives not otherwise captured by the other independent variables.   
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Table 3. Variable Measurements at the Local Level  
Variables Measurements Data Source 
Dependent variable  
Policies Adoption 
Number of contracts, grants 
adopted in categories of Energy-
efficiency Programs, 2009-2013 
Department of energy Data 
Reported by the American 
Recovery and 
Reinvestment 
Act(www.recovery.gov) 
Independent variable 
Federal Financial Support  
The amount of cities’ obligated 
ARRA funds that were actually 
issued for energy-efficiency 
programs at the local 
government level, 2009-2013 
Department of energy Data 
Reported by the American 
Recovery and 
Reinvestment 
Act(www.recovery.gov) 
Economic and Demographic  
Land size 
Income 
 
Population 
 
 
1)Land Area in Square Miles 
2)Per Capita Personal Income 
adjusted in 2013 dollars  
3)Number of whole population  
 
 
U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Preference for Energy-
efficiency Policy   
1)The Presence of ICLEI 
membership in a city (1= 
presence, 0=otherwise) 
2)Dummy variable indicating 
whether or not each city had 
signed the Climate Protection 
Agreement  
(1= presence, 0=otherwise) 
International Council for 
Local Environment 
Initiatives (ICLEI), 
U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, Mayors Climate 
Protection Center 
Manufacturing Influence 
 
Number of establishments by 
the manufacturing sector in each 
city  
U.S. Census Bureau, 
County Business Patterns,  
NAICS 31-11 
Political influence  
 
The percentage of each city’s 
total votes that supported the 
Democratic candidate in the 
2012 presidential election 
 
CQ Voting and elections 
Collection 
Government Type Cities with the presence of a 
council-manager form 
(1=presence, 0=otherwise) 
Yearbooks of the 
International City/County 
Management Association 
Education Attainment Percentage of Population over 
the age of 25 with a BA or 
higher 
U.S. Census Bureau  
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Results 
Table 4 presents the relevant descriptive statistics for the 2009- 2013 period.  The 
number of grants received by the cities ranged from 0 to 60 with a mean of 0.508 and 
standard deviation of 2.744.  The amounts of these grants, again considering all cities, 
ranged from $0.00 to $1,971,000,000 with an average of $5,633,965 aggregated over the 
period of the study.  Substantial variation existed among the cities in terms of size, 
demographic composition and government structure.  The city with the smallest 
geographical footprint was 0.028 square miles and the largest was 606.422, with a mean of 
27.858.  Per capita personal income ranged from $12,917 to $160,956 with a mean of 
$49,610.  As for the remaining variables, 11% of the cities had membership in the 
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) membership; population 
ranged from 120 to 3,897,940, with a mean of 80,449, and 76% of the cities had a council 
manager system of government.  
In terms of climate protection agreement, 32% of the cities had in place as of 2009 
a climate protection agreement with a U.S. Green House Gas reduction goal.  The 
percentage of the city’s population over age 25 with a BA degree or higher ranged from 
2.7% to 68.6%, with a mean of about 18.95%.  Manufacturing influence varied 
considerably, in the range of 0 to 4,956 of the number of establishments by manufacturing 
sector, with a mean of about 23.51.  Finally, in regards to political support variables, the 
percentage of each city’s total votes that supported by Democratic candidate ranged from 
8.5% to 87.4% means of close to 50%.6 
  
                                                          
6  Examination of the correlation matrix revealed that none of the covariates were highly correlated. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Energy-efficiency Grants and Initiatives 0.508 2.744 0 60 
ARRA Fund  ($1,000,000) 5.633 58.882 0 1971.731 
Land Size (in square miles) 27.858 57.209 0.028 606.422 
Per Capita Personal Income ($1,000) 49.610 19.936 12.917 160.956 
Population (1,000) 80.450 241.058 0.12 3897.94 
ICLEI 0.113 0.317 0 1 
Climate Protection Agreement 0.321 0.467 0 1 
Manufacturing Influence 23.514 195.627 0 4956 
Political Influence 49.175 12.226 8.5 87.4 
Government Type 0.765 0.423 0 1 
Education Attainment  18.950 7.366 2.7 68.6 
Note: N = 3480  
 
Table 5 presents the results of the hurdle model, including both the conditional 
logistic model designed to control for which cities did and did not apply for grants and the 
zero-truncated Poisson count model designed to predict positive counts of grants received.7  
The goodness of fit results of the Poisson count model with all of the independent variables 
had a deviance of 1048.881, indicating that the model provided a reasonable description of 
the data with a p-value of less than 0.05. Also, the log likelihood ratio chi-square test, LR 
χ2 (14) = 1923.90, p < .001, indicated that the full model with ten predictors had a 
significantly better fit than the null model. I also used Ramsey’s RESET test to indicate 
whether there were any important omitted variables.  The results of Ramsey’s RESET test 
were not indicative of any regression pathologies (Gujarti and Porter, 1999. p.215-217).  
The coefficient estimates from the conditional logistic model are presented in terms 
of the natural logs of likelihood values.  Accordingly, for each $1M increase in the amount 
of the grants, the probability that a local agent would apply for and receive a grant relative 
                                                          
7  Tests for pathologies in the model provided no indication of problems.  Variance inflation factor 
(VIF) values in the multicollinearity tests were all less than 2.0.  Likelihood ratio tests indicated no evidence 
of any significant over-dispersion.  
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to not increased about 54 times.  The probability that cities with a council-manager form 
of government would apply for and receive a grant was about 214 times greater relative to 
cities without this form.  The probability was much greater that local agents would apply 
for and receive a grant in 2010, relative to not, and much less in 2013.  Otherwise, the 
statistically significant evidence indicates that neither a city’s per capita personal income 
nor the influence of manufacturing in the city was of any consequence in determining 
whether that city would apply for a grant.  None of the other coefficients were statistically 
significant.   
In terms of the count model, as American taxpayers might hope, all else held equal, 
increases in levels of ARRA expenditures significantly increased the number of energy-
efficiency initiatives and corresponding programs and policies at the local level.  Not 
surprisingly, cities with somewhat higher per capita income tended to adopt more energy-
efficiency programs.  Cities with more-general preferences for adopting such policies, as 
signaled through ICLEI membership, and cities with somewhat greater support by political 
influences also received more grants and adopted more programs and policies. As 
previously mentioned, cities with more manufacturing establishments tended to receive 
fewer grants and to adopt significantly fewer energy-efficiency programs and policies.8   
  
                                                          
8  The coefficients on the year dummies were consistently significant, positive, and increasing over 
the time of the ARRA, when compared to the base year. 
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Table 5.  Impact of Local Characteristics on Energy-Efficiency Policy Adoption by 
ARRA Energy-Efficiency Subsidies  
Parameters of Count Model Equation  
Dependent variable: number of grants in each recipient city 
 Coefficients Robust Std.  P-value 
Constant -10.111*** 1.053 0.000 
Financial Support (ARRA funds) 0.591*** 0.051 0.000 
Land Size -0.002 0.002 0.347 
Income 0.019** 0.008 0.011 
Population 0.000 0.000 0.410 
ICLEI 1.502*** 0.299 0.000 
Climate Protection Agreement  -0.101 0.325 0.755 
Manufacturing Influence -0.001** 0.000 0.016 
Political Influence  0.010*** 0.012 0.005 
Government Type -0.216 0.543 0.691 
Education  0.000 0.018 0.999 
Year_2010 0.217 0.142 0.125 
Year_2011 0.522*** 0.141 0.000 
Year_2012 0.788*** 0.177 0.000 
Year_2013 0.954*** 0.207 0.000 
Parameters of Conditional Logistic Model Equation9 
Dependent variable: 0 = city with no grants, 1 = city with at least one grant 
 Coefficients Robust Std.  P-value 
Constant -22.971*** 3.118 0.000 
Financial Support (ARRA funds) 3.995*** 0.567 0.000 
Land Size 0.021 0.199 0.288 
Income -0.047*** 0.014 0.001 
Population -0.002 0.003 0.472 
ICLEI 2.370 1.898 0.212 
Climate Protection Agreement  -1.778 1.212 0.142 
Manufacturing Influence 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 
Political Influence  -0.155 0.143 0.277 
Government Type 5.368*** 1.308 0.000 
Education  -0.123 0.063 0.152 
Year_2010 2.739** 1.272 0.031 
Year_2011 0.164 1.197 0.891 
Year_2012 -4.933 3.419 0.149 
Year_2013 -11.233*** 1.288 0.000 
Notes: ** p<0.05, p<0.01*** 
Omitted category: Calendar year 2009 
                                                          
9  The coefficients from the conditional logistic model are given in terms of logs of likelihood ratios.  
These mean, for example, the probability that manufacturing influence distinguished cities that received at 
least one grant relative to the probability that it did not is positive and significant.  Positive coefficients imply 
that greater values of the corresponding variable tended to amplify the probability that applicants in a city 
would receive a grant relative to the probability that they would not.  Conversely, negative coefficients imply 
that increased values of the variable tended to inhibit receipt of grants.  The larger the absolute value of the 
coefficient, the greater the degree of amplification or inhibition. 
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Discussion 
 During the 2008 and 2009 recession, the Obama administration used ARRA funds 
for macro-economic purposes of helping to recover from the recession.  A substantial 
amount of federal expenditure occurred directly at the local level, and this was designed to 
stimulate local energy-efficiency.  This research has shown that the $21.8 billion in ARRA 
funds expended with the stated intent of improving energy-efficiency did indeed stimulate 
the sought-for energy-efficiency initiatives, and that it increased levels of adoption of local 
energy-efficiency programs and policies.  It also showed that local factors tended to at least 
partially determine the levels of these initiatives.  All else held equal, when financial 
support for energy-efficiency within any given city increased, so did the numbers of 
energy-efficiency grants and initiatives.  Federal government expenditures can thus 
evidently play a central role in directly stimulating more energy-efficiency policies at the 
local level. 
 In regard to research question about how local factors affect the application and 
receipt of new federal grants, the probability that local actors will participate significantly 
increases when the amounts of the grants increase and when the local government has a 
council-manager form.  Also, in contrast to previous research indicating that political 
influences would have discernable effects on participation, the results were inconclusive.  
Taken together, these results lead us to cautiously infer that the choice to participate in the 
ARRA energy efficiency grant programs was more the result of professional decisions to 
improve energy efficiency than of political ones to advance any sort of partisan or other 
normative agenda. 
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 In regards to the extent of participation, which is to say the number of grants 
received by cities that received at least one of them, one of the specific expectations was 
that those cities which signaled a preference for efforts to promote sustainable energy, 
energy conservation, or energy saving would adopt more energy-efficiency programs and 
policies.  Consistent with this expectation, I found that the presence of local government’s 
voluntary networks, such as ICLEI membership had a significant positive effect on 
promoting more energy-efficiency initiatives.  City governments have increasingly joined 
this network to better achieve sustainable energy, energy conservation, or energy-
efficiency.  Differing preferences and priorities of the citizenry of various cities are 
reflected in related policy decision-making processes, and those local citizenries that take 
sustainability issues more seriously are probably apt to apply for ICLEI membership. This 
research’s findings suggest that local government participation in such voluntary programs 
as these are significant in promoting energy-efficiency initiatives. 
 The results also provide empirical confirmation for a number of specific 
hypotheses. Political ideology in city can evidently exert significant influence on local 
energy-efficiency initiatives, programs and policy adoption.  The results indicate that 
cities are more likely to adopt more energy-efficiency programs and policies if they have 
a higher percentage of residents supporting Democratic candidates.  This is consistent 
with previous results showing that Democratically-oriented political ideologies are 
associated with a higher likelihood of adopting environmental and energy policies toward 
sustainable energy.    
 As I also expected, the empirical evidence indicates that cities with a greater 
presence in manufacturing industries are less likely to adopt more energy-efficiency 
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programs.  Evidently, from a manufacturing perspective, federally funded programs and 
policies supportive of improvements in local energy-efficiency are not always necessarily 
everything they are chalked up to be among the public at large.  While this result may be 
counter-intuitive, it is nevertheless the one predicted by Jevon’s Paradox.  That is, Jevon’s 
Paradox predicts that manufacturers will see increases in energy-efficiency as being a route 
to aggregate increases in total energy demanded and consumed, not decreases.  Moreover, 
unless any given manufacturing firm’s own decrease in cost per kWh attributable to 
energy-efficiency exceeds its share of the aggregate cost increase attributable to increased 
aggregate demand by all affected firms, the net effect of federally funded energy-efficiency 
programs would be to increase the firm’s cost of energy.  In any case, despite the fact that 
manufacturing firms have tremendous economic significance in some cities, in some 
instances to the point of being the city’s economic lifeline, a higher presence of such firms 
in a city was, in the data, empirically associated with fewer ARRA grants and 
correspondingly fewer energy-efficiency initiatives, programs and policies. 
 The fact that per capita personal income had a positive effect on the number of 
grants received contradicted the expectation that, because of the prevalence of WAP grants, 
energy-efficiency initiatives would be less frequent in cities with higher income levels.  But 
it is consistent with the alternative line of reasoning in which cities with higher income 
levels are more likely to be able to afford to undertake more innovations and therefore may 
have more motivation to undertake energy-efficiency initiatives relative to cities with lower 
income levels.  
 The statistically insignificant coefficients on several of the variables were 
unexpected on the basis of previous research, including education, population, land size, 
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government type, and Climate Protection Agreement.  In regards to education variable, the 
level of education did not have any relationship at all with the numbers of grants received.  
In regard to population and land size variables, although the expectation was that larger 
populations and more land area would predict more energy-efficiency initiatives, evidently 
population and land variables measured at the local level do not have any relationship at 
all in this regard.  Also, although local government scholars have investigated the impacts 
that forms of government have on policy choices to seek protection of the environment, 
and for sustainable energy, the findings indicate that a mayor-council government does not 
influence energy-efficiency initiatives or the adoption of related programs and policies. 
Indeed, although local government scholars have in the past found that a city’s membership 
in the Climate Protection Agreement is associated with a higher likelihood of adopting 
environmental and energy policies, the findings indicate that the presence of a Climate 
Protection Agreement does not influence energy-efficiency initiative or the adoption of 
related programs and policies.    
 While the empirical model established that ARRA funding succeeded overall at 
stimulating local initiatives, it also has implications in terms of how to design cost-effective 
federal expenditure policies for energy-efficiency.  With the ARRA, the federal 
government provided state and local governments with a specified temporary amount of 
funding designed to address broad purposes of energy efficiency. The ARRA thus provided 
a testing ground for exploring the federal role in diffuse energy-efficiency policy adoption, 
including competitive block grants, project-specific categorical grants, as well as formula 
grants.  Together, they seem to have comprised an effective mechanism for the diffusion 
of more programs and policies, at least in the short term. Although further research might 
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be conducted to separate and tease out the differences between the levels of effectiveness 
of each of these types of grants, this research has shown that, should the need arise for 
further federal expenditures for energy-energy in the future, taken together they are 
effective.  Past this point, the most efficient and effectively-targeted expenditure policies 
would evidently be those that direct relatively larger expenditures specifically toward 
physically higher income, Democratically-oriented cities with less manufacturing 
influence, and ones that signal their preference for environmental protection by such means 
as membership in the ICLEI. 
 Finally, it is worth briefly pointing out that the use of the hurdle model is not only 
appropriate but highly desirable in this and a range of similar contexts in which the 
underlying process has two stages.  Public administration scholars often encounter such 
contexts.  In this research for instance, in the first stage of the process, cities self-selected 
to apply for and receive ARRA energy-efficiency grants in any given year, or not.  In the 
model, cities that received one or more grants were thus first distinguished from cities that 
received no grants at all.  Then, in the second stage, for those cities that received at least 
one grant, the number of grants received was determined.  The basic idea is that a Bernoulli 
probability governs the binary outcome of the first stage, and then, if the outcome is 
assigned a positive value then the “hurdle” is crossed and the conditional distribution of 
counts for all observations that crossed it is governed by a truncated-at-zero count data 
model.  The structure of this model is thus suitable for a wide range of research applications 
in the public administration and policy fields.   
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Conclusion  
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was the largest federal 
energy-efficiency investment in U.S history.  The awards it provided helped local 
governments and agencies to make countless initiatives toward developing and adopting 
energy-efficiency programs and policies.  At the same time, it is important to examine and 
evaluate the choices made and programs and policies undertaken as a result of this 
investment, as a means of informing energy policies in the future.  Without well-designed 
policy evaluations, it will remain difficult, at best, to say whether policies have the effects 
stipulated in statements of legislative intent. 
 Accordingly, this analysis of the ARRA energy-efficiency expenditures made 
directly to local levels shows clearly that the $21.8 billion in ARRA funds expended with 
the stated intent of improving energy-efficiency actually led to more energy-efficiency 
grants, programs and policies within local communities.  It also established a range of 
determinants of the levels of initiative taken by the various cities that received these grants.   
 ARRA-funded energy-efficiency grants were a one-time federal investment or 
single-shot stimulus in the energy policy field (Carley, 2016a).  The grants were thus 
limited in the sense that continuous local-level improvements through similar investments 
in the future would require the long term stability and predictability of similar investments 
by the federal government (Terman et al., 2016).  Although one-shot federal spending may 
not be optimal for achieving longer term improvements, the empirical evidence herein 
suggests that the short-term expenditures led to effective performance in terms of 
promoting the diffusion of energy-efficiency policies, at least in the short term and at the 
local level.  From this viewpoint, future research should include empirical study of whether 
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short-term investment might be important for achieving longer-term energy-efficiency 
policy goals. Future studies are also needed using Bayesian multilevel models to determine 
the impact of previously enacted state policies on the adoption of related local policies, as 
well as other models and data to examine competing perspectives concerning the use of 
block grants versus other grant mechanisms to achieve national sustainable energy goals.  
  
43 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III  
JOB CREATION GENERATED BY THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND 
REINVESTMENT ACT: EVIDENCE FROM THE SECTORS OF THE ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY (ESSAY 2) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was a large-scale short-
term federal initiative passed in 2009 as a Keynesian macroeconomic measure to support 
national economic recovery during the Great Recession. Job creation was important in 
the ARRA. ARRA’s immediate goal was to stabilize the economy and preserve and 
restore jobs (Conlan et al., 2017). The goal of the ARRA funds was to invest in the 
foundation for a robust and sustainable 21st century economy (Charles, 2011). Over $ 90 
billion of ARRA funds was invested in energy projects that improved long-run 
productivity through the development of sustainable energy technologies. These 
investments covered renewable energy generation, clean transportation, energy 
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efficiency, grid modernizations, advanced vehicles and fuels, carbon capture and storage, 
and green innovation.  
 The primary goals in the Department of Energy (DOE) under the ARRA included 
rapid job creation, job retention in energy use, and energy savings. The ARRA funds had 
played an important role in the rapid growth in the renewable energy and energy 
efficiency market. The federal government expected that roughly 5 million new jobs 
would be created as a result of ARRA investments (Charles, 2011).   
 Recently, performance assessments of the energy programs created under the 
ARRA have received considerable attention (Carley et al., 2014; Terman et al., 2016). 
Researchers have studied the ARRA implementation process (Carley et al., 2014; Terman 
et al., 2016), state experiences with the ARRA (Carley, 2016), and the effect of ARRA 
funds on specific programs such as the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) (Tonn 
et al., 2016). However, although the literature provided sound reasons to expect that the 
ARRA expenditures supported many jobs, no published research has yet examined 
empirically how the ARRA funds performed in creating jobs with regard to energy 
efficiency and renewable energy sector. Accordingly, this study empirically evaluated the 
effectiveness of the ARRA funds on job creation generated in the energy efficiency and 
renewable energy sector by focusing on the impact of federal energy programs spent in 
the Department of Energy (DOE) under the ARRA.  In particular, this research focused 
on the impact of the ARRA funds allocated through each contract or grant provision 
within the DOE under the ARRA.  
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 Grants or contract programs funded through the DOE under the ARRA had 
tended to focus on the state and local ground-level aspects of service delivery. Overall, 
the subsidies from the ARRA did not change hierarchically-oriented federal-state-local 
relationships. However, allocation through grants or contract provisions were dependent 
on state or local networks to achieve national policy outcomes. In addition, each state 
government decided how to allocate its share of the ARRA funds to local governments as 
well as non-governmental entities. Thus, this research focused specifically on the 
effectiveness of energy policies implemented through grant or contract provision under 
the ARRA funds. Nevertheless, tax incentive or tax credit programs did not rely on the 
DOE’s approval regarding their criteria of allocation.  
 The ARRA of 2009, commonly called the “stimulus,” was designed to spur 
economic growth while creating new jobs (Conlan et al., 2017). Many ARRA projects 
focused on immediately jumpstarting the economy. Some projects, such as those 
involving investments in energy technology, were expected to contribute to economic 
growth. Ultimately, the objective of renewable energy, or energy efficiency policies 
implemented under the ARRA was concentrated on energy-related jobs creation through 
promoting new advanced clean technologies (Carley, 2011; Mundaca & Richter, 2015). 
This research was intended to evaluate whether the ARRA achieved its stated objective 
of increasing job creation.  Accordingly, this research reviewed the definition of 
implementation and the meaning of its related “success”. Next, this research described a 
theoretical approach to successful implementation. Then, this study described and 
statistically tested the hypotheses related to the factors that influence successful job 
creation in the sector of efficient energy and producing energy from renewable sources in 
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the short-term (2009-2013 years), as well as in mid-term (2007-2013 years) and long-
term (2003-2013 years) periods.  In the short term approach, this research focused on 
assessment of the impact of ARRA funds on job growth in the energy efficiency and 
renewable energy sectors.  
Theoretical Framework: Successful Implementation of Federal Energy Policy 
 Policy refers to the principles or intentions that guide specific actions, such as 
specific legislative acts or programs (Palumbo et al., 1984). Policy is programs that are 
implemented. Programs can be aimed at achieving a particular policy (Palumbo et al., 
1984). Procedures in the programs are also intended to accomplish statutory goals.  
 In the public administration literature, scholars have pointed that policy outcomes 
are theoretically dependent on the implementation activities. Specific goals and well-
designed interventions are essential for successful implementation (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973). Ong (2012) also identified that successful implementation requires 
several factors: purposeful attention, procedures and processes to overcome internal and 
external barriers, explicit and quantifiable objectives to monitor progress, ongoing 
assessments to identify implementation problems, and a willingness to revise and refine 
efforts when required.  
 The majority of empirical research on general assumptions of the successful 
implementation has been focused on whether administrators strive to meet performance 
goals (Hood, 2006; Terman & Yang, 2013). In particular, few qualitative studies have 
highlighted the problems associated with policy implementation of the ARRA (Carley et 
al., 2014; Terman et al., 2016). They defined the concept of successful implementation 
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that stated goals were accomplished in the planned timeframe and without exceeding 
budgetary constraints. They concluded that implementation delays was one factor that 
hinders successful policy implementation under the ARRA. However, despite the goals 
under the ARRA expected to have more tangible outcomes such as creating jobs and 
cutting electricity bills, no empirical studies have been analyzed the effectiveness of the 
ARRA expenditures targeted in job creations.  
 Accordingly, this research framed a conceptual definition of successful 
implementation by assessing whether the desired results were met. This research focused 
on whether implementation under the Recovery Act achieved job creation. Specifically, 
this study was focused on the job creation counted in the energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sector.   
ARRA Funding  
 Funding and investment at the intersection between economic development, 
energy policy and planning has been on the rise over the last decade (Carley, 2016). Most 
recently, ARRA provided a wide array of policy instruments to stimulate the U.S. 
economy and establish a robust technological infrastructure for long-term economic 
growth (Aldy, 2013). ARRA was designed to emphasize the connection between 
economic development and energy policy by specifically targeting the energy sector. 
Approximately $60 billion were spent on the energy sector (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2009) on renewable energy, energy efficiency, smart grids, and advanced fossil 
fuel energy programs among multiple others. Much of the ARRA funding was designed 
to support existing energy programs, but some funds were dedicated to new energy 
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programs focused on energy planning and economic development (Carley et al., 2011). In 
particular, the ARRA had overall goals: (1) create new jobs and save existing ones, (2) 
spur economic activity and invest in long-term growth (Hall & Jennings, 2011).  
 Recent research has started to examine the actual effects of energy-related ARRA 
expenditures. Specifically, the Council of Economic Advisers (Executive Office, 2016) 
estimated that ARRA clean energy-related programs supported roughly 900,000 jobs in 
innovative clean energy fields between 2009 and 2015. Link and Scott (2012) discussed 
how Small Business Research (SBIR) programs in the U.S. created and administered by 
such agencies as the Department of Defense, and the National Institutes of Health, 
NASA, and the U.S. Department of Energy can be credited with an average of about 42 
new jobs per $1,000,000 of government award funding. However, most assessments on 
the relationship between ARRA expenditures and its actual effects have focused on the 
general effects inferred from all federal ARRA funds rather than expenditures 
specifically designed for energy. 
 Furthermore, still no published research has yet examined the impact of the 
ARRA funds implemented under the intergovernmental grant. Federal ARRA funds 
allocated under the EERE of DOE relied on networked governance system through 
existing networks of state and local. State and local governments, under the DOE, 
designed their programs and procedures and allocated the ARRA funds at their own 
discretion. The ARRA funds were passed through state governments with their direction 
to competitively award the funds to local governments. It was managed by state office 
with their own discretion, not by federal DOE governments. In other words, each state 
government decided how to allocate its share of the funding to local governments as well 
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as non-governmental entities. Under the these structure, some state spent larger amount 
of ARRA funds activity their programs in their own discretion with more ARRA money, 
other states might not or did not do so.  However, most of ARRA funds studies focused 
on national-level impacts, neither has any study tested empirically on the association 
between spent ARRA expenditures and energy relevant job creation at the state level. 
Accordingly, this research hypothesized that state governments that spent a larger 
amounts of ARRA funds were more likely to create more jobs in the energy efficiency 
and renewable energy sector.  
Subnational Government Capacity 
 Scholars have long recognized that the capacity of subnational governments is 
essential to the implementation of federal policy (Derthick, 1970; Elazar, 1984; Gamkhar 
& Pickerill, 2012; Hall et al., 2011; Jennings et al., 2012; Carley et al., 2015). The term 
of the capacity is broadly defined as the ability of organizations to carry out their 
missions and achieve their goals (Ingraham, Joyce, & Donahue, 2003). Capacity, defined 
in various ways, has been shown to correlate with implementation success for all three 
levels of government, federal, state and local (McDermott, 2006). State capacity is 
especially crucial to the efficiency with which federal dollars are spent (Carley et al., 
2015). Subnational capacity includes inputs such as labor and finances (Honadle, 1981; 
Hall, 2008; Carley et al., 2015), and depends on the stock of institutional, organizational, 
and individual resources (Honadle, 1981; Bowman & Kearney, 1988). The presence of 
greater capacity of all types in subnational governments can lead to greater progress 
toward their policy goals and implementation (Hall, 2008).  
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 A rich theoretical body of scholarship has analyzed empirically the relationship 
between subnational government capacity and the variation of policy outcome. 
Specifically, Terman and Feiock (2014) investigated the relationship between energy 
policy outcomes and local administrative capacity based on a principal-agent theory. 
Specifically, they estimated administrative capacity in terms of the number of financial 
management staff members in a municipal government per 1000 residents. They 
measured implementation timing, defined as the deviation in days of delay for each 
energy project implemented, and used it as a dependent variable. Their result showed that 
lack of staff capacity had a statistically negative effect on energy policy implementation. 
Although the federal government provides increased funding with various training and 
technical support opportunities to help implement energy efficiency and conservation 
projects, it is important to ensure sufficient local staff for proper policy implementation. 
Also, Krause et al (2014) assessed the sustainability programs in US cities based on 
interest group support, governmental capacity, policy characteristics, and institutional 
structures.   The authors suggested that relationships among numerous specialized 
departments and agencies are important to facilitate sustainability efforts, and those 
institutional environments shape the motivations of local government officials. 
Furthermore, they linked fiscal resources to policy performance. This research argued 
that establishing an office focused exclusively on sustainability is likely to involve 
substantial start-up costs. One of their areas of interest, the support from local 
environmental groups, was measured based on data the Integrated City Sustainability 
Database (ICSD) of 2005. The results showed that local governments with greater 
financial resources and institutional environments with greater support from 
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environmental groups had a significantly positive effect on sustainability policy 
management in the executive branch at the city level.  
 In terms of the ARRA process, Carley and Hyman (2014) asserted that multiple 
local and state governments, much like the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), were 
unprepared to implement ARRA’s requirements (in terms of lacking sufficient qualified 
personnel, or relevant policies and procedures to handle extensive amount of ARRA 
funds) in the required time frames. Government data, provided by the Recovery 
Accountability and Transparency Board, demonstrated that there were spending delays 
both within and outside of government and that ARRA was significantly more difficult to 
implement in a timely manner than policymakers intended; some states also encountered 
more difficulties than others.  Therefore, based on these previous findings, this research 
hypothesized that state governments with larger expenditures allocated by federal 
government are more likely to create more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sector. 
 Furthermore, this research considered the impact of the non-government 
expenditures as mechanisms consists of voluntary collaborations that are made between 
government agencies and non-government donors in supporting mutual initiatives. 
According to DOE’s strategic investment in science and technology, State Energy Office 
(SEO) was inviting proposals funded by cooperative agreements, between government 
and private industry (DOE, 2014). Specifically, the projects related to the Clean Coal 
Power Initiative and America’s Next Top energy Innovator, as well as Energy Innovation 
Portal are implemented through federal programs with non-governmental funding. Even 
though these programs operate out of the state government, their participation is never 
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funded by this SEO.  In theoretical perspective, non-government funding’s participation, 
provided by external entities like non-government organization, have been recognized as 
important strategies to expend their effectiveness into broader trends associated with the 
energy policy (Carley, 2011). However, the effectiveness of the decentralized fiscal funds 
in the implementation stages of energy policy have not been investigated empirically. 
Therefore, this research considered the categories of expenditure allocated by the non-
government sources on activities that are specifically related to energy. This study 
expected that state governments with larger magnitudes of non-government expenditures 
are more likely to have more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector.    
Political Influences 
 It is generally argued that liberal political ideology is associated with green 
energy policies and renewable energy programs (Yi & Feiock, 2014). The ideological 
propensity of the governor and the legislators not only shapes the support for green 
energy regulations, but also influences innovative green energy technologies’ 
development and diffusion (Coley & David, 2012). Stable and predictable political 
circumstances are essential for the deployment and development of green energy.  Recent 
research has analyzed the direct relationship between states with a democratic governor 
and policy implementation outcomes (Carley et al., 2015; Jennings et al., 2012; Delmas 
& Montes-Sancho, 2011; Lyon & Yin, 2010). These studies have stipulated that 
democratic governors may have tighter goal alignment with the Obama administration’s 
stimulus program and seek to implement the programs more efficiently and effectively.  
According to Jennings, Jennings and Zhang (2012), ARRA was a highly politically-
charged policy. Democrats strongly supported President Obama’s claims that ARRA 
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would create jobs, while zero Republicans in the House and only three Republican 
senators cast votes in favor of the bill.  In this context, the findings of Jennings, Hall and 
Zhang, Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, and Fisher (2015) confirmed a relationship between 
political affiliation and states’ ability to spend on energy. Delmas and Montes-Sancho 
(2011) demonstrated how political influence can affect energy policy by showing that the 
percentage of House and Senate seats in the states’ government occupied by Democrats is 
positively and significantly related to the effectiveness of RPS policies. Lyon and Yin 
(2010) also found that states with a strong democratic presence were more likely to adopt 
an RPS.  Based on these findings, this research expected that states served by Democratic 
governors were more likely to successfully create jobs in the energy efficiency and 
renewable energy sectors.   
Circumstances that Use Renewable Energy Sources    
 Following other local environmental policy research (Ong, 2012; Yi, 2014; 
Krause et al., 2015), a greater presence of firms that use renewable energy is likely to 
provide more job opportunity for green business or employment that are specifically 
related to renewable energy or efficient energy. If state have industry or establishment 
that use more renewable energy, it may be able to attract more employment opportunities 
in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector. Therefore, we expected that all else 
held equal, states with a greater circumstances that use renewable energy resources in 
electric power generation are more likely to create more jobs in the energy efficiency and 
renewable energy sector.   
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Economic Characteristics 
 Following previous studies, state-specific economic characteristics are always 
relevant in the growth of clean or green energy. The first such factor is the overall level 
of state economic activities, as characterized by greater per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP). A recent study found that the higher a state’s per capita GDP, the larger the 
market size in the state, which creates a sufficiently large market to achieve economies of 
scale for green energy or clean energy and for related industries to develop and grow (Yi, 
2013). Bowen et al. (2013) confirmed that empirical evidence consistent with the positive 
impact of per capita gross state product (GSP) on increasing in green business.  Porter 
and Stern (2001) showed a positive relationship between creation of the green jobs and 
per capita GSP, which was a main determinant for patterns of technological performance. 
Thus, this study expected that state governments with vibrant economies are more likely 
to have more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector.     
 Secondly, in the literature on the relationship between population density and job 
creation. Previously published empirical research also demonstrated that greater 
population sizes tend to present more job opportunities to provide services of efficient 
energy or renewable energy. They argued that if a state has greater population, it may 
have a greater chance of creating new innovative technologies (Sadorsky, 2013). More 
highly populated states with greater concentrations of human resources also tend to have 
correspondingly more green jobs employed for installation and maintenance (Madlener & 
Sunak, 2011). Moreover, this study expected that more highly populated state with 
greater concentrations of human resources are more likely to have more jobs in the 
energy efficiency and renewable energy sector.    
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Research Methods 
 
Conceptual Model  
 The purpose of this research was to analyze the factors that influence job creation 
in the sectors of efficient energy and producing energy from renewable sources.  This 
research focused on the impact of the ARRA funds allocated through intergovernmental 
grant provision under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) of 
the Department of Energy. This research tested whether the ARRA expenditure, as a one-
time shot, leads to a spike in job creation in the energy sector or whether it has long-term 
impacts on job creation. This research used panel data of 49 states in the U.S. over the 
period 2005-2015. All of the previously mentioned factors had to be statistically 
considered.   
 To isolate the effects of the ARRA funds, this research first included a set of 
control variables to account for those confounding factors. In addition, this study also 
included lagged variables for the ARRA expenditure allocated in selected energy 
program in order to capture any lagged effects of the ARRA funds in previous year.  To 
control for remaining omitted variable bias, this research used instrumental variables for 
the ARRA expenditure on selected grant programs. Thus, this research estimated two-
stage models: This research conducted the first differenced analysis with instrumental 
variables approach to consider the assumption for the endogeneity of the ARRA funds.  It 
was approached in first-differenced two-stage least squares (FD2SLS) estimation to 
control the assumption that lagged ARRA variables may be correlated with the error 
term. All results included robust standard errors to adjust for potential heteroscedasticity 
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and serial autocorrelation in the model (Wooldridge, 2003), this was done with allowing 
fixed effects.   
 The analysis assumed an underlying process with two stages. The first stage 
generated whether or not ARRA funds (endogenous variable) associated with 
instrumental variables and the second generated the model captured the two effects 
included the direct effect from the explanatory variables, and the proxy effect from the 
omitted variables: 
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡 =  𝜋0 +  𝜋1𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡 +  𝜋2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦_𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 +  𝜋3𝑋𝑠𝑡
′  + 𝛼𝑠 +  𝜗𝑠𝑡 
(1) 
 In the first stage equation (1), 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡 represents the total amount of 
federal ARRA expenditures allocated in seven grant programs (See Table 8) under the 
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) by the Department of 
Energy, under the ARRA, in state s, and individual year t. This research included two 
instrumental variables that did not enable job creation or promote, but it may correlated 
with the level of the allocated ARRA funds. As instrumental variables, this research used 
the 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡  which means the amount of ARRA funds spent under the block grant 
types in state s, and individual year t,  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦_𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 which means policy 
duration that has been adopted Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and Energy 
Efficiency Resources Standards (EERE).  This study expected that two instrumental 
variables are highly correlated with the 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡  it which means total amount of 
ARRA expenditures allocated in seven energy grant programs under the Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE).  
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 𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑠𝑡
′ + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑇+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆 + 𝜗𝑠𝑡   
(2) 
 In the second stage equation (2), 𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is the total number of jobs 
counted in energy efficiency and energy from renewable sources in the classification 
identified in the Green Goods and Services (GGS) in state s and year t. In all equations,  
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠(𝑡−𝑖) represents the total amount of federal ARRA expenditures allocated 
in seven energy grant programs under the EERE, under the ARRA, in state s, and 
individual year t with lag length of i. It was meant lagged effects of total amount spent in 
seven energy grant programs by EERE under the ARRA. The lag length of i was used 
from one year to three years. The appropriate lag length was determined by the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) (Popp, 2016). Where 𝑋′𝑠𝑡 was a vector of independent 
variables including government financial capacity, political circumstance, renewable 
energy circumstances, and economic characteristics in state s and year t  was error term 
into identically distributed state-effect term.  
Data 
Dependent variable  
 The dependent variable reflected the number of jobs created in the energy 
efficiency and renewable energy sectors. This research used the definition of category of 
“Green Goods and Services” (GGS) as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). This study focused only for the first and second categories of energy efficiency 
and energy from renewable sources (See Table 6). This research did not include all 5 
categories of GGS as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (energy from renewable 
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sources; energy efficiency, pollution reduction and removal; natural resource 
conservation, and environmental compliance). The first and second categories, within the 
GGS, were counted as a proxy for jobs related to the energy efficiency and renewable 
energy (See Table 6). 
Table 6. Classification of the Green Goods and Services (GGS) 
 Classification of the Green Technology under Green Technology Piot Program 
1 Energy from Renewable Sources 
2 Energy Efficiency 
3 Pollution Reduction and Removal, Greenhouse Gas Reduction, and Recycling and 
Reuse 
4 Natural Resources Conservation 
5 Environmental Compliance, Education and Training, and Public Awareness 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Retrieved from https://www.bls.gov/ggs/  
 
Independent variables 
 The empirical model represented the factors that, on the basis of previous 
research, might have influenced in energy-related job creations. See Table 7 for a 
description and the source of each independent variable in the empirical model. The 
categories of these variables coincided with those considered above, including (1) ARRA 
funds, (2) subnational government capacity, (3) political circumstances, and (4) 
circumstances that use renewable energy sources (5) economic characteristics.  
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Table 7. Variables Measurement 
Variables Measurements Sources 
Dependent Variable 
Job in Energy 
Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy 
Sector    
 
The number of jobs counted in energy 
efficiency and energy from renewable 
sources, into the definition of category of 
Green Goods and Services (GGS) as 
defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) 
Independent Variable 
ARRA Funds 
1) Total amount of federal ARRA 
expenditures spent in 7 grant 
programs under the Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(EERE) ($10,000,000). 
Department of Energy 
Data Reported by the 
American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act 
(www.recovery.gov) 
 2)  The lag length was used from one 
year to three year ($10,000,000). 
 
Sub-National 
Government 
Capacity 
1) Total amount of federal expenditures 
annually allocated by the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) 
($10,000,000) 
 
 
 
USASPENDING.GOV 
(www.usaspending.gov) 
2) Total amount spent under the federal 
DOE program through non-
government funding participation 
($10,000,000) 
Political 
Circumstances 
State with a Democratic governor (1 
indicating the governor is a Democrat 
and 0 if not) 
Multistate Associates 
Incorporated (MAI) 
Circumstances that 
Use Renewable 
Energy Sources 
Number of establishments that use 
renewable energy resources 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Economic 
Characteristics 
1) Per capita Real GDP adjusted in 
2015  
Census of Governments 
and Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
( BEA) 
2) Number of people residing per 
square mile of land  
Instrumental Variable 
ARRA Funds in 
Block Grant 
 
Circumstances of 
State Energy 
Policy 
 
1) Total amount of federal ARRA 
expenditures spent under the 
CCDBG, CSBG and CDBG 
2) Duration of Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS) and Energy 
Efficiency Resources Standards 
(EERE), in years 
 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics(BLS), 
Database of State 
Incentives for 
Renewable & Efficiency 
(DSIRE) 
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 This study used federal government ARRA expenditures awarded through 
intergovernmental grants under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(EERE).  The variable contained observations of the total amount spent in seven 
intergovernmental grant programs aimed to energy efficiency and renewable energy 
innovation under the EERE (See Table 8).  
 This research expected that the ARRA expenditures spent in intergovernmental 
grant programs, intended to support the energy efficiency and renewable energy, would 
be associated with the job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector. 
Because, the ARRA goal was intended to create new jobs, with the perspective of energy-
based economic development, within strategies to produce new advanced energy 
technologies (Carley et al., 2014).  Indeed, this research employed ARRA expenditure’s 
lagged variables with length of three years to address the short-run and long-run effects 
of ARRA expenditures. It had been represented as the cumulative effects of the ARRA 
expenditures for the past three years. Accordingly, this research used the amount of the 
ARRA funds that were actually spent in the seven intergovernmental grant programs 
under the EERE of the DOE aimed to promote renewable energy or energy efficiency 
(See Table 8).  
 In order to conduct the analysis at the state level, this research focused on selected 
seven intergovernmental grant programs that were managed by State Energy Office 
(SEO), not by the federal DOE. According to implementation process for selected energy 
programs, each state decided how to award these sub-grants at their own discretion. The 
recipients of these grants were determined by the state governments. SEO designed and 
carried out their own renewable energy and energy efficiency program. They had 
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responsibility to coordinate the development of projects and funds allocation. Thus, this 
research focused on state level impact of the ARRA federal funds implemented through 
intergovernmental grant program. The ARRA data were collected from Department of 
Energy Data reported by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(www.recovery.gov).  
Table 8.   Intergovernmental Grant Funded under the DOE’s ARRA 
DOE 
Office 
Grant Provision Grant Purpose 
 
 
 
 
Office of 
Energy 
Efficiency 
and 
Renewable 
Energy 
(EERE) 
1) Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Block Grants 
Grant for supporting energy conservation 
in the transportation, building, and other 
sectors and renewable energy development 
2) Weatherization Assistance 
Grant Program 
Grant for purchase of the energy efficient 
equipment for low income household 
3) State Energy Grant Program Grant for state-led energy initiatives. It was 
aimed to promote the energy efficiency and 
energy conservation.  
4) State Energy Efficient 
Appliance Rebate Program 
Grant for the purchase of energy-efficiency 
Energy Star products 
5) Advanced Battery 
Manufacturing Grants 
Grant for developing advanced battery and 
battery system 
6) Transportation Electrification 
Grants 
Grant for conducting demonstration 
(evaluation) on advanced electric drive 
vehicles technologies. 
7) Alternative-Fueled Vehicles 
Grants 
Grant for the purchase of alternative fuel 
and advance technology vehicles 
Source: Energy Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Retrieved from 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R40412.pdf  
 
 In addition, this research expected that state governments with greater financial 
capacity were more likely to create jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy 
sector. It focused separately on each category of expenditure allocated by the federal 
government and non-government sources toward sustainable energy. Most state energy 
programs that supported renewable energy or efficient energy relied on existing federal 
government mandating spending. At the same time, government has also invited non-
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federal expenditures as mechanisms consists of voluntary collaborations that are made 
between government agencies and non-government donors in supporting mutual 
initiatives. According to DOE’s strategic investment, they were inviting proposals funded 
by cooperative agreements, between government and private industry (DOE, 2014). Even 
though these programs operate out of the federal government, their participation was 
never funded by this government. Accordingly, the magnitude of subnational government 
capacity were estimated using two sources, specifically, (1) total amount of federal 
expenditures allocated annually by the Department of Energy (DOE) , (2) total amount 
allocated within federal DOE programs with non-government funding participation.  
Relevant data were gathered from USA Spending (www.usaspending.gov). 
 Next, previous research has shown that the presence of a political orientation of 
the Democratic are more likely to support to green economies that are associated with the 
effect on the quality of the environment (Clark & Whitfor, 2011; Krause et al., 2014). 
Therefore, this research expected state served by Democratic governors are more likely to 
successfully create job in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector.  The 
independent variable related to political circumstances were measured by dummy 
variable coded ‘1’ for state with a Democratic governor and ‘0’ for others.  
 Furthermore, this research has expected that the state with a great circumstances 
that use renewable energy resources are more likely to create job in the energy efficiency 
and renewable energy sector. Thus, the model included the number of establishments that 
use renewable energy resources in the electric power generation industries. The industries 
that use wind, geothermal, biomass, and solar electric power generation has defined from 
the Economic Census under the North American Industry Classification System 
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(NACIS). It has been counted at the six digit NAICS codes within six sub-categories (See 
Appendix C); (1) Hydroelectric power generation (NACIS 221111), (2) Solar electric 
power generation (NACIS 221114), (3) Wind industries (NACIS 221115), (4) 
Geothermal (NACIS 221116), (5) Biomass (NACIS 221117). Data was retrieved from 
the Census Bureau Economic.   
 In addition to the main variables of interest discussed earlier this research control 
for state economic characteristics, including population density and per capita Gross State 
Product (GSP). Previously published research suggests that population density influences 
the level of green job creation (Balbo, 1993; Yi, 2014). If state area is experiencing a less 
population density, energy-relevant job can hardly experience any growth. More densely 
populated areas are expected to lead to increased demand for energy, which magnifies the 
pressure for energy efficiency, resulting in government and utility investment in energy 
efficiency and thus creating energy-relevant jobs.  Population density was measured by 
the number of people residing per square mile of land. Also, state’s economic 
characteristics have been previously found to influence administrative implementation 
and behavior (Portney, 2003). States’ wealth might impact the proportion of their funds 
allocated for energy programs (Carley et al., 2014). Park (2015) argued that during the 
Great Recession administrators were forced to slow down the increase in the green 
energy sector and shift expenditures to social policies and elsewhere. Thus, this research 
expected that that s states with vibrant economies were more likely to create jobs in the 
energy efficiency and renewable energy sector. The data related to the conditions of the 
state economies were collected from the U.S. Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
64 
 
(BEA), and U.S. Census of Government. All relevant numbers were adjusted for inflation 
and listed in 2015 dollars suing the GDP deflator.  
Instrumental variables  
 The first instrumental variable was the total amount of federal ARRA funds spent 
in three block grant programs aimed to provide federal grants to state or local 
governments: (1) Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) program, (2) 
Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) program and (3) Community Development 
Block Grant (CDBG) program. .  Under the ARRA, block grant programs were designed 
to stimulate innovation at the state and local levels (Conlan et al., 2017). The ARRA 
funding, through the block grant programs, increased rapidly over the time period of the 
ARRA (Dilger & Boyd, 2014).  Specifically, state and local governments received $52.9 
billion in the form of grant-in-aid funds under the ARRA (Conlan et al., 2017, p.33). This 
funding was intended to reform federalism relationships as well as to reduce bureaucratic 
redundancy and cost (Terman & Feiock, 2014). These funds were also allocated under 
the decentralized framework. What this research proposes is that the funding of the 
ARRA block grants was analogous to that of ARRA energy intergovernmental grants 
implemented through the EERE. Because, governments tend to pursue similar reforms 
(Urpelainem & Yang, 2017); when the ARRA energy funds were allocated under the 
decentralized framework for simulating energy innovation, they were so allocated as to 
mirror the funding of the block grants.  Therefore, this research assumed that states with 
greater ARRA expenditure spent in three block grant programs might be spent more 
intergovernmental grant implemented under the seven programs of EERE.  
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 The second instrumental variable was the circumstance of state energy policy. A 
comprehensive energy policy plan entails long-term commitments to enhance social 
values and goals toward sustainable energy (Baumol & Oates, 1988). States differ by 
existing policies and expertise accumulated through experiences in energy policy 
implementation toward sustainable energy.  For this reason, motivation to implement 
energy policies tends to vary between state and municipal governments. Some states 
respond with minimal efforts towards sustainable energy policies, other states have 
implemented programs early and actively provided resources and diverse policy 
instruments. In this context, one might expect that that governmental agencies with more 
experience in state energy policy implementation have more accumulated information on 
how policies can be better implemented, what is feasible or preferable, when agencies 
should act to implement a policy, and what should be changed for better performance.  In 
this perspective, this research assumed that states with more accumulated implementation 
experience related to state energy policies would have spent more energy related ARRA 
grants. 
 For the instrument to be valid, this research confirmed that the total amount of 
ARRA expenditures spent in the CCDBG, CSBG and CDBG, were highly correlated 
with the total amount of ARRA expenditures allocated through seven intergovernmental 
grant programs under the DOE’s EERE, but not directly related to variation of job 
created in energy efficiency and renewable energy sector. The circumstances of state 
energy policy was also correlated with the total amount of ARRA expenditures spent in 
seven intergovernmental grant programs under the EERE (See Appendix D).   
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 According to the results of the first stage with the instrumental variables, there 
was a strong positive association between the ARRA funds spent in three block grant 
programs and the ARRA energy funds spent in seven intergovernmental grant program 
under the EERE. Also, when the ARRA energy grant were spent under the EERE, there 
was a significant difference between states with more accumulated implementation 
experience related to state energy policies and those with less experience related to state 
energy policies. Those states with more implementation experience related to energy 
policies had higher rates of the ARRA funding expenditure in seven intergovernmental 
grant programs. Thus, this research discovered that the potential drivers behind ARRA 
energy investment were the amount of ARRA funds spent in the tool of block grants and 
the circumstances of state energy policies.    
 In order to suggest validity of the instrumental variables, the week identification 
test was used based on the F-statistic (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The results of this test 
showed that the instrumental variables were strong. The F-statistic for the first-stage 
regression analysis was consistently much larger than 10 (Table 9). A test of 
overidentifying restrictions was performed in order to verify the validity of instrumental 
variables. The null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are valid was not rejected.   
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Table 9.  First-Stage Results with Instrumental Variables (IVs) 
Model 1 Coef. Std. Err P-value 
ARRA Funds Spent under the Block Grant 
Types 
0.730*** 0.182 0.000 
Circumstance of State Energy Policy 0.212* 0.127 0.095 
ARRA Funds under the EERE  
One-year lag 0.946*** 0.042 0.000 
Two-year lag -0.135* 0.069 0.052 
Three-year lag -0.197*** 0.056 0.001 
Government Financial Capacity 
Federal DOE Expenditures -0.000 0.002 0.923 
Non-Government Expenditures -0.022 0.023 0.345 
Political Circumstance 
Democratic Governor 0.053 1.381 0.970 
Renewable Energy Circumstance 
Establishment that Use RE in Electric 
Power   
-1.80e+05 1.20e+05 0.136 
Economic Characteristics 
Per Capita Real GDP -0.000 0.000 0.388 
Population Density  0.000 0.000 0.141 
Under-identification Test p-value 0.000 
Weak-identification Test (F-statistic) 27.625 
Over-identification Test of  instruments Test p-
value 
0.141 
Year FE YES 
Observation 539 
 Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, p<0.01*** Dependent variable was total amount of ARRA expenditures spent 
in seven grant programs under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. 
 
 
Results 
 Table 10 presents the relevant descriptive statistics for the states, excluding D.C. 
and Hawaii from 2005 to 2015. The number of job counted in energy efficiency sector 
ranged from 61.74 to 19498.56 with a mean of 1983.172 and standard deviation of 
2548.957. The number of job counted in renewable energy sector ranged from 10.98 to 
7986.47 with a mean of 752.063 and standard deviation of 1050.341. The number of job, 
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counted in combined sectors in energy efficiency and renewable energy, ranged from 
72.72 to 27319.77 with a mean of 2735.235 and standard deviation 3579.751.  
 The ARRA funds spent in the seven grant programs administered by the EERE 
ranged from $0 to $2,109,441,787 with an average of $1,851,895 over the period. Next 
the amount of federal expenditures allocated annually by the DOE ranged from $258.824 
to $42,601,587,316 with an average of $805,128,732 aggregated over the period of the 
study. The total amount spent within state DOE programs through non-governmental 
funding ranged from $0 to $3,405,072,313 with an average of $70,658,346 over the 
period of the study.   
 In terms of political circumstances, 53.8% of the states had Democratic governor, 
the influence of industries that use renewable energy resources in electric power 
generation varied considerably, in the range of 0 to348, with a man of 30.15. Finally, in 
regards to economic characteristics, per capita GDP ranged from $31.169 to $78,835 with 
a mean of $49,579; population density ranged from 279.022 to22889.19 people per 
square mile, with a mean of 5224.836. As instrumental variables, the amount of ARRA 
funds spent in the CCDBG, CSBG, and CDBG ranged $0 to $674,560,200 with an 
average of $15,514,690 over the period. In terms of circumstances of state energy 
policies, the duration of the RPS and EERS ranged from 0 to 34 with a mean of 4.56 
years.  
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
The number of jobs counted in energy 
efficiency sectors (1,000)     
1983.172 2548.957 61.74 19498.56 
The number of jobs counted in renewable 
energy sector (1,000) 
752.063 1050.341 10.98 7986.47 
The number of jobs counted in energy 
efficiency and renewable energy sector 
(1,000) 
2735.235 3579.751 72.72 27319.77 
ARRA Funds  ($10,000,000) 18.51895 36.16792 0 210.9442 
Federal DOE funds ($10,000,000) 80.512 218.920 0.025 4260.159 
Non-Federal Funds ($10,000,000) 7.065 26.007 0 340.5072 
Democratic Governor 0.538 0.499 0 1 
Establishment that Use RE in Electric 
Power 
30.153 44.873 0 348 
Per Capita Real GDP ($) 49579.61 9672.184 31,169 78835.42 
Population Density  5224.836 5432.428 279.022 22889.19 
ARRA Funds in Block Grants 
($10,000,000) 
1.551 5.298 0 67.456 
Circumstance of State Energy Policy 4.560 6.419 0 34 
  Note: N = 539 
  
 Table 11 presented the results of the first difference model with instrumental 
variables allowing fixed effects. In the results of the test of endogeneity, this research 
presented the p value of the endogeneity test, these results indicate that the instrumental 
variables lead to changes in the results. Null hypothesis, that ARRA funds spent in seven 
intergovernmental grant programs are exogenous, were rejected at the all models, as the 
p-value of the endogeneity test was 0.000. This research captures that state government 
may be able to attract more ARRA funds if they have more experiences on energy 
policies, or similar policy implementation tool.  These measures helped correcting for the 
ARRA funds’ effects.  This research’s results have controlled all the omitted variables in 
each model.  
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 Table 11 showed the results on the job creation for both individual years and the 
cumulative effect. ARRA funds, spent in seven intergovernmental grant, had the positive 
cumulative effect in job creation in energy efficiency sector (Model 1), renewable energy 
sector (Model 2), and combined sectors (Model 3). In addition, all models showed the 
importance of lagged ARRA funds’ effects. After two years, the ARRA funds had a 
highly significant impact in job creation despite a negative impact occurred after one year 
of the ARRA expenses.  
 As previously mentioned, states with more densely populated areas tended to have 
more job related to energy efficiency and renewable energy. States with vibrant 
economies were also tended to have more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sector. 
 At the second column for each model includes results assuming all variables are 
exogenous. These results were similar to those from the main first difference models. 
Also, in all of the statistical models, the year dummy variables for year specific effects 
showed that more energy technologies were generated in 2009 and 2013 since the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was enacted in 2009. These results give us 
evidence of the effectiveness of Federal stimulus package under the ARRA of 2009.10 
  
                                                          
10  Autocorrelation had been checked through the Durbin-Watson statistic and did not find any 
problem in three different models. 
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Table 11. Job Creation in Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Sector 
 Model 1: EE Model 2: RE Model 3: EE and RE 
IV exog IV exog IV exog 
ARRA Funds under 
the EERE 
28.414*** 
(4.630) 
2.682*** 
(0.973) 
11.190*** 
(1.946) 
1.299*** 
(0.456) 
39.604*** 
(6.481) 
3.980*** 
(1.384) 
One-year lag -11.407*** 
(1.953) 
-4.934*** 
(1.044) 
-2.586*** 
(0.821) 
-0.098 
(0.489) 
-13.994*** 
(2.734) 
-5.032*** 
(1.485) 
Two-year lag 8.489*** 
(2.312) 
4.133*** 
(1.417) 
3.240*** 
(0.972) 
1.566** 
(0.665) 
11.728*** 
(3.236) 
5.699*** 
(2.016) 
Three-year 
lag 
25.406*** 
(2.286) 
25.030*** 
(1.479) 
12.010*** 
(0.961) 
11.865*** 
(0.694) 
37.415*** 
(3.200) 
36.896*** 
(2.104) 
Government Financial Capacity 
Federal DOE 
Expenditures 
0.067 
(0.067) 
0.009 
(0.042) 
0.027 
(0.028) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
0.093 
(0.093) 
0.014 
(0.061) 
Non-
Government 
Expenditures 
0.095 
(0.720) 
-0.394 
(0.463) 
-0.034 
(0.302) 
-0.222 
(0.217) 
0.061 
(1.008) 
-0.615 
(0.658) 
Political Circumstance 
Democratic 
Governor 
-55.486 
(63.631) 
-22.339 
(41.027) 
-17.448 
(26.756) 
-4.706 
(19.244) 
-72.934 
(89.070) 
-27.046 
(58.356) 
Renewable Energy Circumstance 
Establishment 
that Use RE  
-1.51e+07 
(1.08e+07) 
-9.28e+06 
(6.96e+e6) 
-7.86e+06 
(4.54e+07) 
-5.64e+06* 
(3.26e+06) 
-2.29e+07 
(1.51e+07) 
-1.49e+07 
(9.90e+06) 
Economic Characteristics 
Per Capita 
Real GDP 
0.040* 
(0.022) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.016* 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.056* 
(0.030) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
Population 
Density 
1.598** 
(0.678) 
1.154*** 
(0.436) 
0.735*** 
(0.285) 
0.565*** 
(0.204) 
2.333*** 
(0.949) 
1.719*** 
(0.620) 
Cumulative Effects of 
ARRA 
50.900*** 
(5.214) 
26.911*** 
(2.099) 
23.852*** 
(2.192) 
14.631*** 
(0.984) 
74.753*** 
(7.299) 
41.542*** 
(2.986) 
Endogeneity Test P-
value 
0.000  0.000  0.000  
Observation 490 490 490 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, p<0.01*** 
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Discussion  
 From energy security (Valentine, 2011) and mitigation of climate change 
(Edenhofer et al., 2011; Liang & Fiorino, 2013) to boosting economic growth (Bowen et 
al., 2013; Yi, 2013; Apergis & Payne, 2010) and employment (Lambert & Silva, 2012), 
sustainable energy has been found to positively affect multiple aspects of our lives. 
Federal, state, and local government has been offering numerous programs and financial 
provisions to support and further encourage the production of renewable energy.  
 The ARRA of 2009 provided a wide array of policy instruments to stimulate the 
US economy and establish a robust foundation for long-term economic growth. The clean 
energy package played an important role in the ARRA job creation activities (Aldy, 
2013). This research has focused that whether federal ARRA investments implemented 
through intergovernmental grant programs, designed toward clean energy, lead to a spike 
in job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector at the state level.  
This research has provided a new policy insight by investigating the effectiveness of the 
temporary investment allocated through the ARRA, on creating jobs in energy-related 
area.  
 Specifically, this research confirmed that cumulated ARRA expenditures 
allocated through State Energy Office (SEO) from federal EERE led to higher level of 
job creation in energy efficiency and renewable energy during the ARRA period. 
Although the results showed that the ARRA spending had a negative impact in the short-
term (one-year after), these results had been matched the previous proposition that some 
states encountered more difficulties to implement ARRA funds which raised several 
intergovernmental challenges related to communication and administration (Carley & 
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Hyman, 2014). Two years after, the ARRA funds led to positive impact on more job 
creation. This research’s results support that job creation activities require some time. It 
was strongly associated with delayed effects of government investment. 
 This research’s results also provide empirical confirmation that that temporary 
government funding evidently played a determinative role in directly stimulating more 
jobs in energy efficiency, renewable energy fields, despite the previous theoretical 
scholarship that recognized only long-term governmental funding positively affecting 
policy outcome.  These positive impact of the temporary ARRA funding may be 
impacted by the intergovernmental grant process. The intergovernmental grants funded 
by the ARRA were designed to distribute funds to state or local governments so that they 
could quickly spend on projects that would create jobs and foster growth in their 
communities (Terman & Feiock, 2012).  These empirical results showed that government 
funds implemented under these intergovernmental grants process had positive impacts in 
short term to stimulate employment in energy efficiency, and renewable energy sectors.   
 Also, it comes as no surprise that the number of jobs in energy efficiency (Model 
1), renewable energy (Model 2), and combined sectors (Model 3) were directly related to 
per capita gross state product. States with higher per capita gross state product are likely 
to be more economically productive and prosperous, thus making job creation more 
likely in energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors. Indeed, as we also expected, 
this research’s empirical results confirmed that population density are positively 
associated with energy efficiency and renewable energy relevant job. Empirical 
evidences showed that more highly populated state with greater concentrations of human 
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resources are more likely to have more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sector.   
Conclusions 
 The ARRA was the largest federal investment in U.S. history to support national 
economic recovery during the Great Recession. It included explicate goals for stimulating 
the job creation through investment in new energy technologies with respect to the 
sustainable use of energy. This research tested whether the ARRA expenditures, that 
were intended to stimulate the U.S. economy through establishing an innovative energy 
technologies, achieve their goals. This research confirmed that cumulated ARRA 
expenditure made in intergovernmental grant programs through the EERE led to higher 
levels of job creation in energy efficiency, and renewable energy sectors.  
 At the same time, the ARRA funds, as one-shot grants, were intended to be 
simulative, quickly spending of the money was important for achieving the goals in the 
short term (Terman et al., 2016). Intergovernmental grant program was important tool to 
stimulate that the ARRA funds were spent quickly. This research provides the empirical 
results on the link between the ARRA funds implemented through the intergovernmental 
grant program and its effects. These finding has implications that it is important to inject 
a decentralization approach through intergovernmental grants regarding how government 
expenditures can more efficiently promote for job stimulating. 
 Although one-shot federal spending may not be optimal for achieving longer term 
impacts of job creation, the empirical evidence suggests that the short-term expenditures 
led to effective performance in terms of job creation through investment in advanced 
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energy technologies with respect to the sustainable use of energy, at least in the short 
term and at the state level. From this viewpoint, future research should include empirical 
study of whether government temporary investment might be important for achieving 
longer-term job creation. Future studies are also needed investigation on the impact of 
government expenditures implemented through the non-governmental contractors to 
achieve national sustainable energy goals.   
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CHAPTER IV  
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION ACTIVITIES GENERATED DURING THE 
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
ALTERNATVIE ENERGY PRODUCTION AND ENERGY CONSERVATION 
(ESSAY 3) 
 
 
Introduction 
 Technological change has been heavily influenced by changes in market demand 
or by advances in science and technology (Nemet, 2009). Governments have employed 
various strategies to promote the adoption of innovative energy technologies into the 
technology-push (supply-side) and demand-pull (demand side). One of the most 
commonly applied strategies to facilitate technology development is policy-directed 
investment that subsidizes the cost of research and development (Siddiki et al., 2015).  
President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
of 2009. It was to support national economic recovery during the Great Recession. It 
included explicit goals for stimulating the economy through energy efficiency, energy 
savings, and energy conservation with energy technologies (Carley, 2012). During the 
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period of the ARRA, unprecedented investments were made to promote advanced, 
efficient and clean energy in ways that contribute to reginal wealth creation.  According 
to the Act, some of the highlights of the ARRA funds, administered through the 
Department of Energy (DOE), included the Advanced Research Project Agency’s Energy 
program (ARPA-E) to support innovative energy technology. ARPA-E, within the 
Department of Energy, supported energy technology research projects with the goal of 
enhancing the nations’ economic and energy security. 
 To achieve these goals, the ARRA funds infused $275 billion in grant funds to 
state and local governments, and another $224 billion for purposes such as enhanced 
innovative technology systems (Conlan et al., 2017).  Energy-related policy goals 
stipulated in the rationales for these ARRA expenditures, over $36 billion was intended 
specifically to catalyze innovation. These funds were allocated to academic institutions, 
companies, research foundations, and industry research collaboration through state and 
local government. These were focused largely on upgrading the energy technologies in 
the areas of energy efficiency and renewable energy projects and programs.   
            Recent research has started to discuss the actual effects of the ARRA 
expenditures. Some has looked at the impact of ARRA expenditures aimed at renewable 
energy (RE) technologies on the job creation and environmental dimensions using 
qualitative research (Toepler & Sommerfeld, 2017). Other has focused on assessment of 
the ARRA expenditures in terms of helping to bring new technologies related to solar, 
wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy sources at the national-level (Executive 
Office of the President., 2016).  The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) also evaluated 
how well ARPA-E was achieving its goals and mission (National Academies of Sciences, 
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2017). Still other research focused on assessment of the experiences of a range of 
national actors during the ARRA period (Carley, 2016; Terman et al., 2016; Tonn et al., 
2016; Hall & Edward, 2011a; Hall & Edward, 2011b; Jennings et al., 2012). However, 
although the literature provides sound reason to expect that the ARRA expenditures 
substantially influenced innovation and development within the advanced energy sector, 
no published research has yet examined empirically whether they effectively achieved 
their stated objectives in regards specifically to technological energy innovation.  
Accordingly, this research empirically evaluated the effectiveness of the ARRA funds 
that tended to focus on the state and local ground-level aspects of grants aimed toward 
technologies energy innovation. It focused specifically upon grant program designed for 
purposes of stimulating innovation in the areas of alternative energy production and 
energy conservation.  
Theoretical Framework:  Technological Innovation in Fiscal Decentralization   
 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) emphasis in 
implementation shifted from ‘government’ to ‘networked governance’ in achieving 
public goals (Conlan et al., 2017). ARRA funds were spent by state and local 
governments. Each state government decided how to allocate its share of the funding to 
local governments as well as others. State and local governments had fragmented and 
independent authority to craft their actions to match their unique circumstances. The 
grants from the ARRA funds did not change hierarchically-oriented federal-state-local 
relationships. But they did stimulate collaboration between state and local governments 
as well as federal and local governments.  
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 Specifically, the renewable energy and energy efficiency grant programs 
implemented under the networked governance system included the State Energy Program 
(SEP), Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG), Weatherization 
Assistance Program Grant (WAP), and State Energy Efficient Appliance Rebate Program 
(SEEARP). These grants were provided in Department of Energy’s Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE).  In terms of the implementation of SEP, 
EECBG, WAP, and SEEARP, all states were eligible to apply for direct formula grants 
and competitive grants from federal DOE. Grants were allocated to state energy offices 
through formula grants for projects and planning, and they were was allocated through 
competitive grants to local entities. Each state decided how to award these sub-grants11. 
The recipients of these grants were determined by the state governments, not the federal 
government. The ARRA amount received by each state was sub-granted to units of local 
government in the state that were not eligible for direct formula grant from federal DOE. 
In other words, the states designed and carried out their own renewable energy and 
energy efficiency programs. They were managed by state energy offices, not by the 
federal DOE. The federal DOE provided administrative and institutional support, such as 
the scope and goals of each energy program.   
 In particular, the application for the EECBG was strongly restricted depending on 
the population. Cities were eligible for EECGB grants either directly from the federal 
DOE or from the state in which they were located. A city with a population of at least 
                                                          
11  Goldman, C. A., Stuart, E., Hoffman, I., Fuller, M. C., & Billingsley, M. A. (2011). Interactions 
Between Energy Efficiency Programs funded under the Recovery Act and Utility Customer-Funded Energy 
Efficiency Programs. Lawrence Berkely National Laboratory.  
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35,000 was eligible for a direct formula grant from federal DOE. A city with a population 
below 35,000 was eligible for a sub-grant from the state energy offices. All cities were 
eligible to apply for competitive grants from DOE regardless of population.  The 
recipients of competitive grants were smaller cities, and a recipient city was determined 
by the state, not the federal government.  
 As part of the ARRA, DOE’s National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), 
on behalf of the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, provided funding 
opportunities for Advanced Battery Manufacturing Grants12.  Eligible applicants for this 
grants were unrestricted. Grants under this program was awarded to meritorious projects 
through a competitive process. Local governments, or non-government entities in each 
state that were interested in applying for competitive grants, were eligible to make their 
application.  Also, Transportation Electrification Grants and Alternative-Field Vehicles 
Grants were administered by the State Energy Office (SEO)13. State or local officials 
made choices in how these grants programs would related to existing program. SEO had 
responsibility to coordinate the development of projects and funds allocation14.   
 State and local governments, under the Department of Energy, designed their own 
competitive programs and procedures and allocated the (cash) grants at their own 
discretion. Some parts went directly to local agencies so that they could quickly be spent 
                                                          
12  Transportation Electrification Grant Program, National Energy Technology Laboratory, 16 Mar. 
2009. Retrieved from  https://www.netl.doe.gov/research/coal/carbon-storage/carbon-storage-
infrastructure/arrasitechar 
Retrieved from https://www.netl.doe.gov/File%20Library/Library/Environmental%20Assessments/12-20-
12-Signed-Chemetall-Foote-Silver-Peak-FONSI.pdf  
13  Retrieved from https://www.arc.gov/funding/EnergyARRAGrantInformation.asp  
14  Goldman, C. A., Stuart, E., Hoffman, I., Fuller, M. C., & Billingsley, M. A. (2011). Interactions 
Between Energy Efficiency Programs funded under the Recovery Act and Utility Customer-Funded Energy 
Efficiency Programs. Lawrence Berkely National Laboratory. 
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on programs, projects and policies that would foster growth in their communities 
(Terman & Feiock, 2014). Some of them were directly awarded to non-governmental 
agencies.  
 In the perspective of how large amounts of ARRA funds were effectively 
implemented, or not, recent studies have mentioned that the federal government relied on 
existing state and local agencies to implement ARRA funds.  The implementation process 
offered very flexible aid to stimulate innovation at the state and local levels (Conlan et 
al., 2017, p.5).  ARRA’s design reflected tools of fiscal decentralization in federal 
policies. The ARRA preferred a mixed program with state and local governments as well 
as nonprofit, or private entities for purposes such as enhanced innovative technology 
systems (Sissine, et al., 2009). Much of the Recovery Act’s funding was primarily 
intended to help state and local governments finance their own policy goals.  
 In the related stream of public administration, previous research has also focused 
on decentralized networks approaches in achieving national objectives. Specifically, 
Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire (2011) remarked that the key to networked 
government is that various actors, including public managers should have a role to play in 
local, community-based initiatives. Goldsmith and Kettl (2009) have explored the role of 
federal policymakers in effectively utilizing decentralized networks in federal policy 
implementation. However, no studies have empirically tested the association between 
financial resources allocated under the decentralized networks and innovation in energy 
technologies.  
 Moreover, as is recognized by a growing body of literature, all of these 
ideographic factors must be identified and systematically considered if one is to 
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convincingly establish that decentralized networking has a positive impact on innovation 
activities related to energy technologies at the state level. This study focused on the fiscal 
decentralization framework and state governments who had autonomy in ARRA grant 
allocation to serve their goals in the energy sector. A number of such factors have been 
identified, as described in the following subsections.    
Government Financial Capacity 
 Governments employ various strategies to reduce barriers to technology, 
particularly where widespread adoption would align with broader policy goals.  The U.S. 
government has invested heavily in policies to support the development of innovative 
energy technologies. A portion of this investment has been specifically targeted at 
improving energy efficiency and renewable energy. In the past decade, scholars have 
written that many technology innovation activities or strategies require large, consistent, 
and long-term financial investments to encourage an uptake in technologies (Kalter & 
Vogely, 1976). A rich theoretical body of scholarship has analyzed empirically the 
relationship between the pattern of financial investment by governments and the variation 
of energy technology innovations. Liang and Fiorino (2013) investigated the relationship 
between policy stability in public resource allocation and policy outcomes in renewable 
energy technologies from 1974 to 2009 at the national level. They found technology 
innovation is affected by both the magnitude of federal research and development (R&D) 
expenditures and the stability of government financial commitment. Margolis and 
Kammen (1999) concluded that inadequate energy R&D spending and low R&D 
intensity in the energy sector led to low levels of energy technology patenting activities. 
Backstrom et al. (2014) demonstrated that large amounts of public R&D financial support 
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had an important impact on solar photovoltaic (PV) innovations for 13 countries over the 
time period 1978 to 2008.  Most existing empirical studies have only focused on the 
effects of the expenditure patterns of the federal government; they have criticized rapid 
changes of funding levels and instability in funding trends in regard to the development 
of technologies within the influence of the federal government’s expenditures.  
 Furthermore, most programs that supported technological innovation relied on 
existing federal government mandating spending.  At the same time, government has also 
invited non-federal expenditures as mechanisms consists of voluntary collaborations that 
are made between federal agencies and non-government donors in supporting mutual 
initiatives.  According to DOE’s strategic investment in science and technology, DOE 
was inviting proposals funded by cooperative agreements, between government and 
private industry (DOE, 2014).  The projects related to the Clean Coal Power Initiative 
and America’s Next Top Energy Innovator, as well as Energy Innovation Portal are 
implemented through federal programs with non-governmental funding. Even though 
these programs operate out of the federal government, their participation is never funded 
by this government. In theoretical perspective, non-government funding’s participation, 
provided by external entities like non-government organization, corporations or 
foundations, is recognized as important strategies to expend their effectiveness into 
broader trends associated with the energy policy innovation era (Carley, 2011; Conlan et 
al., 2017). However, although it has been shown that the success of energy innovation 
policies increasingly depend on cooperative activities (agreements) rather than the 
expansion of power of the federal government, the effectiveness of the decentralized 
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fiscal funds in the implementation stages of policy have not been investigated empirically 
(Carley, 2011).  
 Therefore, this research separately considered each category of expenditure 
allocated by the federal government and non-government sources on innovation activities 
toward new energy technologies.  Accordingly, this research hypothesized that state 
governments with larger expenditures allocated by federal government are more likely to 
have higher levels of innovation activities toward new energy technologies. Also, this 
study expected that state governments with larger magnitudes of non-government 
expenditures are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities toward new 
energy technologies.  
ARRA Funding  
 In 2008 and 2009, the United States was in the midst of the Great Recession, 
possibly the worst economic situation the nation had faced since the Great Depression. 
One of the first priorities of the new Obama administration was to implement policies and 
programs to turn the economy around. In particular, one of the major economic initiatives 
made by the Obama Administration was the implementation of the American Recovery 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The ARRA provided a wide array of policy instruments to 
stimulate the U.S. economy and establish a robust technological infrastructure for long-
term economic growth (Aldy, 2013). In one important respect, the ARRA was designed 
to emphasize ‘sustainable energy’ or ‘green energy.’ Depending on the definition of 
‘green,’ these instruments tended to focus on technology innovation toward alternative 
energy and energy conservation. Within the government’s ARRA investments, they 
focused on economic activities that improve environmental quality through energy 
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efficiency, savings and conservation utilizing energy technologies. Approximately $840 
billion of the U.S. economy was spent on technological advancements, job creation, and 
infrastructure development in the energy sector (Goldman et al., 2011). Specifically, 
nearly 30 percent was allocated toward renewable energy generation. Approximately 22 
percent was spent towards investments in energy efficiency. Also, 30 percent of budget 
allocations were earmarked for increasing the reliability and sustainability of electricity 
systems. The remaining investments were allocated toward vehicle and fuel 
advancements, improved carbon capture, including storage, and clean energy 
manufacturing.  
 Currently, the energy policy literature contains few analyses that explore the 
effects or effectiveness of the new ARRA funds on the innovative energy technology 
produced during the era of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.  According to 
the Executive Office of the President’s report (2016), the ARRA funding reached nearly 
every aspect of the value chain, for numerous key clean energy technologies, including 
advanced vehicles, batteries, carbon capture and sequestration, and technologies to 
enhance energy efficiency. Also, the literature contains analyses of how ARRA 
investments in the deployment of clean energy technologies helped contribute to dramatic 
cost reductions for those same technologies, as part of a virtuous cycle. Mundaca and 
Richter (2015) provided a comprehensive assessment of the impact of ARRA funding on 
green technologies within resource-intensive approach. They suggested that stimulus 
programs incentivizing research and development in the renewable energy sector led to 
growth in the number of green energy technology patents issued by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 2009 to 2012. They suggested that growth 
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regarding clean energy patents and green technology patents can be attributed to the 
federal renewable stimulus program. In terms of the environmental dimensions of these 
expenditures, the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Monthly Energy Review 
analyzed their effects in terms of reductions in carbon dioxide emissions (EIA, 2013). 
Emissions were allegedly reduced in 2012 due to ARRA’s impacts on technological 
renewable energy deployment.  Recently, the National Academies of Sciences (2017) 
conducted an assessment and technical evaluation of ARPA-E under the ARRA. They 
suggested that ARPA-E awardees, under the ARRA funds, produced patents and 
scientific publications in greater numbers for various technologies. They concluded that 
the flexible management approach should be preserved in technological advances.  
  However, most assessments on the relationship between ARRA expenditures and 
its actual effects have focused on the general effects inferred from all federal ARRA 
funds rather than expenditures specifically designed for energy.  Empirical assessments 
of specific programs intended to focus upon innovation in new energy technologies in the 
body of relevant research are all anecdotal. Thus, in order to fill this gap, this research 
addressed the actual effects of the innovation activities in energy technologies, vis-à-vis 
federal ARRA expenditures intended to stimulate innovation in alternative energy and 
energy conservation. Specifically, the effects of the ARRA expenditures allocated in 
grant programs aimed to promote upgraded energy technologies under the Office of 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). Therefore, this research hypothesized 
that state governments with greater ARRA expenditures allocated for innovation to 
upgrade energy technologies are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities 
toward new energy technologies.  
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Electricity Price  
 Previous studies have identified energy price as a determinant of levels of 
innovation in alternative energy resource technologies.  Several studies have empirically 
tested the effects of energy prices on innovation in induced technologies. Popp (2002) 
tested the effects of energy prices on energy efficiency innovation and found a strong 
effect of energy price on energy efficient innovation, as measured by patent counts.  
Popp, Newell and Jaffe (2009) explained that the direction of innovation likely responds 
positively in the direction of increased relative prices. Johnstone et al (2009) investigated 
the effects of both price-based and quantity-based policies on energy innovation from 25 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. They 
found that an increase in the price of electricity is associated with increased incentives for 
innovation and energy demand, which in turn create incentives for energy technology 
innovation. Another study examined the effect of natural gas prices on renewable energy 
technology development, and the statistical results confirmed that increased prices 
increase levels of innovation (Kneifel et al., 2008).  
 Perhaps the most prominent view of researchers in this area is that advances in 
electricity have allowed the implementation of many technological solutions that can be 
impacted by the variations in energy consumption.  Liang and Fiorino (2013) stated that 
technological capacity can be associated with increased electricity prices. They 
demonstrated how electricity prices were positively related to patent applications, 
suggesting that a higher level of demand contributed to more innovation activities. 
Johnstone, Hascic, and Popp (2010) also indicated that electricity market conditions have 
had little effect on energy innovation. They explained the role of both electricity prices 
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and growth in electricity consumption. Although one might expect more innovation in 
alternative sources when prices are high and consumption is growing (thus signaling a 
need for greater generation capacity), neither variable has had a statistically significant 
effect on patents.  Thus, this research expected to find that states with higher electricity 
prices are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities toward new energy 
technologies.   
Structure of Electricity Market  
 Since the late 1990s, quite a few state governments in the United States have 
relaxed the traditional regime of monopolistic regulation in electricity generating markets 
to allow for the existence of competition. The adoption of electricity competition from 
restructured deregulation had been expected to achieve lower energy costs, diversifying 
energy supply options, ensuring a reliable, encouraging innovation in power supply 
technologies, and affordable supply (Joskow, 2008). Previous research on the effects of 
deregulated electricity markets have concluded that prices are higher in deregulated 
market, but the changes in prices had been greater in the regulated markets (Ardoin & 
Grady, 2006; Joskow, 2006). The effect of market competition on electricity rates is still 
the subject of debated in some restructured states.  However, with perspective of 
generation technology, few studies have addressed that competition can foster 
technological innovation activities. Competition in deregulated electricity markets enable 
the electricity generating industry to invest innew and highly efficient generation capacity 
(Joskow, 2006). In addition to the utility restructuring could accelerate new technological 
innovation in the transmission and distribution grid, it could serve as more cost-effective 
substitutes for transmission upgrades (Carley, 2009; Thomas et al., 2016). Therefore, this 
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research expected to find that states with de-monopolized electricity markets are more 
likely to have higher level of innovation activities in toward new energy technologies.  
Knowledge Stock  
 It is generally argued that knowledge is one of the key factors for creating new 
value. Some studies have attempted to evaluate the effect of variation in knowledge stock 
on variation of innovation in upgraded energy resources.  Many researchers have shown 
that higher educational attainment was positively associated with the increase of 
innovative technology in the United States (Yi, 2014; Yi, 2013; Inglehart & Abramson, 
1994). Empirically, Simons and Choi (2009) demonstrated that more educated people can 
better accept green energy technologies in the building sector. They added that more 
highly educated individuals believe going green is the right thing to do.  Internationally, 
Hobmand and Ashworth (2013) confirmed that educational level was positive and 
significant as an explanatory variable for the diffusion and development of technologies 
related to renewable energy sources, within a sample of 1,907 Australians. Given these 
considerations, I expected to find that states with greater knowledge stocks are positively 
related to the growth of energy technology innovations. Therefore, this research expected 
to find that states with higher knowledge stock are more likely to have higher level of 
innovation activities toward new energy technologies.    
Circumstances that Use Renewable Energy Sources    
 Following other local environmental policy research (Ong, 2012; Krause et al., 
2015), a greater presence of firms that use renewable energy is likely to have the effect 
embedding green technologies for encouraging environmental actions. In other words, 
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machines with new technologies may have been more likely to be owned by firms with a 
higher propensity to switch technology toward renewable energy resources.  The 
variations of innovation in new energy technologies may thus be affected by the 
expressed the willingness of previously existing firms to pay for greener products. 
Therefore, this research expected that all else held equal, states in circumstances that use 
more renewable energy resources in electric power generation are more likely to have 
higher levels of innovation activities toward new energy technologies.   
Circumstances of State-Energy Policies    
 State governments in the U.S. have adopted various clean, renewable, and 
efficient energy policies to achieve sustainable energy objectives. State-level energy 
policy initiatives have promoted the energy innovation in homes, business, industries, 
electricity, and transportation sectors. States differ by existing energy policies 
circumstances. Some states responded with minimal efforts towards energy policies, 
other states have implemented energy programs actively to provide renewable and 
efficiency energy resources. All states started renewable and energy efficiency policies in 
different years. For example, 26 states had implemented the Energy Efficiency Resources 
Standards (EERE) by 2016.  Some of them, like California, started implementation in as 
early as 2004. Also, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) that established requirements 
for the adoption of renewable energy technologies in state electricity markets were 
enacted in Nevada in 1997.  Michigan enacted an RPS in 2008 (DSIRE, 2017).   Longer 
duration of relevant policies was indicative of more time for the planning and 
implementation process as well as knowledge to influence on innovation in the area of 
energy (Bowen et al., 2013).  Therefore, this study expected that all else held equal, states 
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with longer accumulated policies implementation experiences related to renewable and 
energy efficiency are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities toward 
new energy technologies.   
Political Circumstances  
 It is generally argued that liberal political ideology is associated with green 
energy policies and renewable energy programs (Yi & Feiock, 2012). The ideological 
propensity of the governor and the legislators not only shape the support of green energy 
laws (Coley & Hess, 2012), but also influence the innovative green energy technologies’ 
development and diffusion.  As shown in the literature of policy termination, a stable and 
predictable political environment is essential for the deployment and development of 
green energy (DeLeon, 1983). Previous studies have analyzed the relationship between 
states with a democratic governor and energy policy outcomes (Carley & Nicholson-
Crotty, 2015). Republican legislators tend to limit diffusion of the state green energy 
policies (Coley & Hess, 2012).  This is also consistent with recent efforts made by 
Republican legislators in a dozen states to repeal the renewable portfolio standard (RPS). 
Previous evidence also shows that Democratic governors are associated with a higher 
likelihood of adopting environmental programs (Ringquist, 1993). Having a Democratic 
governor could result in better green energy policy design, which could be more effective 
in achieving the pre-design policy goals. Based on the above literature, the research focus 
of this article was in examining the relationship between the political orientation of the 
governor and policy outcomes for innovations in energy electrical technologies. This 
research tested the effects of political circumstances, as it pertains to Democratic 
governors and their effect on innovative activities new energy technologies, from 2005 to 
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2015, in the United States. Thus, this study expected to find that states with a more 
legislature seats occupied by Democrats are more likely to have higher levels of 
innovation activities in new energy technologies, when compared to states with a 
Republican governor.  
Economic Characteristics 
 Following previous studies, state-specific economic characteristics are always 
relevant in the growth of innovative technology. The first such factor is the overall level 
of state economic activities, as characterized by greater per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP). A recent study found that the higher a state’s per capita GDP, the larger the 
market size in the state, which creates a sufficiently large market to achieve economies of 
scale for innovative technology and for related industries to develop and grow (Yi, 2013). 
Porter and Stern (2001) showed a positive relationship between innovative capacity and 
per capita GDP, which was a main determinant for patterns of technological performance. 
Thus, this study expected to find that states with vibrant economies are more likely to 
have higher level of innovation activities toward new energy activities.   
 Secondly, in the literature on the relationship between population and technology 
development, previous evidence has shown that greater population stimulates 
technological change because it increases the number of potential inventors (Kremer, 
1993). Previously published empirical research also demonstrated that greater population 
sizes tend to present more opportunities for developing new technologies. They argued 
that if a state has a larger population it may have a greater chance of creating new 
innovative technologies (Sadorsky, 2013). More highly populated states with greater 
concentrations of human resources also tend to have a correspondingly higher likelihood 
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of creating new technologies (Madlener & Sunak, 2011). This study expected to find that 
states with larger populations are more likely to have higher level of innovation activities 
toward new energy technologies.   
Research Methods 
Conceptual Model  
 The major purpose of this research was to evaluate the effectiveness of the ARRA 
funds on innovative activities in energy technologies.  The focus was upon the 
intergovernmental grants allocated for state and local governments through the Office of 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy of the DOE, since they were where the funds 
were dispersed. Under the ARRA funds, each program design, on the intergovernmental 
grants, was heterogeneous across states. The different program designs across states may 
lead to variation in outcomes. Thus, this study focused on state level analysis. This 
research included years both before and after ARRA from 2005 to 2015 to observe the 
impact of the ARRA funds. The analysis was directed toward whether these one-time 
shot ARRA grants led to a spike in innovation activities and whether it has had any long-
term impact.  All of the previously mentioned factors had to be statistically considered.  
 This study used a first differenced analysis with instrumental variables to consider 
the endogeneity of the ARRA funds.  This was accomplished using a first-differenced 
two-stage least squares (FD2SLS) estimation routine.  The idea was to control 
correlations between lagged ARRA variables and the modeling error term. This was done 
allowing for fixed effects.  
94 
 
 The analysis was limited to 49 states and excluded Hawaii and Washington D.C15. 
The analysis assumed an underlying process with two stages. The first stage generated 
whether or not the ARRA funds (endogenous variable) were associated with instrumental 
variables and the second generated the model that captured the two effects including the 
direct effect from the explanatory variables, and the proxy effect from the omitted 
variables:   
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠𝑡 =  𝜋0 +  𝜋1𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡 +  𝜋2𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +  𝜋3𝑋𝑠𝑡
′ +  𝜋4 ∗ 𝑇+ 𝜋5 ∗ 𝑆 + 𝜗𝑠𝑡        
(1) 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠(𝑡−𝑖) + 𝛽3𝑋𝑠𝑡
′ + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆 + 𝜗𝑠𝑡         
(2)     
 In the first stage equation (1), 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠𝑡 represents the total amount of 
federal ARRA expenditures allocated in seven grant programs (See Table 14) under the 
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) by the Department of 
Energy, under the ARRA, in state s, and individual year 𝑡. This research included two 
instrumental variables that did not statistically relate to energy technologies’ innovation 
or promotion, but were correlated with the level of the allocated ARRA funds. As 
instrumental variables, this study used the 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 which means the 
unemployment rates in state s, and individual year 𝑡, and the 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡 which means 
the amount of ARRA funds spent under the non-energy block grant program in state s, 
and individual year 𝑡. I expected that two instrumental variables are highly correlated 
with the 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠𝑡 which means total amount of ARRA expenditures allocated in 
                                                          
15  There are no complete data sets on energy expenses and policies for the state of Hawaii; 
Washington DC is excluded because the analysis is limited to states.  
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seven grant programs for promoting energy innovation activities under the decentralized 
networks.  
 In the second stage equation (2), 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is the total number of patent 
applications at individual level counted in the classification identified in the Alternative 
Energy Production and the Energy Conservation of the Green Technology Classification 
within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)’ Green Technology Pilot Program 
in state s and year t. In all equations,  𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠(𝑡−𝑖) represents the total amount of 
federal ARRA expenditures allocated in seven grant programs under the EERE, under the 
ARRA, in state s, and individual year 𝑡 with lag length of i. This captured the lagged 
effects of the total amount spent by EERE under the ARRA. The lag length of i was used 
from one year to three years. The appropriate lag length was determined by the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) (Popp, 2016). Where 𝑋′𝑠𝑡 was a vector of independent 
variables including financial capacity, electricity price, structure of electricity market, 
knowledge stock, and influence of industries that use renewable sources, circumstances 
of state-energy policies, political circumstances and economic circumstances in state s 
and year t.  was error term into identically distributed state-effect term.  
Data 
 Dependent variable 
 The dependent variable reflected the total number of patent applications in 
classification identified in the Alternative Energy Production and the Energy 
Conservation of the Green Technology within the USPTO’s Green Technology Pilot 
Program. The Classification of Green Technology was used to isolate alternative energy 
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(Model 1), energy conservation (Model 2) and combined categories (Model 3) regarding 
the labeling of patent applications. These particular classifications were used in order to 
take into account the impact of the ARRA funds on innovation activities related to 
alternative energy and energy conservation. The count of patent application was used as 
proxy for innovative activities instead of patent publication, which would have reflected 
innovation output. Although patent applications may not translate into practice, their 
counts have the potential for most accurately representing the outcomes for technological 
innovative activities (Johnstone et al., 2009). Relevant patent applications were counted 
in the data at the individual patent level, with using codes issued by the USPTO’s Green 
Technology Pilot Program. The concept of the Green Technologies covers a broad range 
of fundamentally different types of innovation including 1) Alternative Energy 
Production 2) Energy Conservation 3) Environmentally Friendly Faming 4) 
Environmental Purification, Protection, or Remediation (See Table 12).  
Table 12.  Classification of the Green Technology 
 Classification of the Green Technology under Green Technology Piot Program 
1 Alternative Energy Production 
2 Energy Conservation 
3 Environmentally Friendly Farming 
4 Environmental Purification, Protection, or Remediation 
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office. USPTO Green Technology Pilot Program, Retrieved from 
http://www.waybetterpatents.com/green_tech_pilot_program.html 
 
 This research was focused on innovative activities of the energy technologies to 
improve energy conservation, and develop alternative sources of energy. This idea was to 
examine the effectiveness of the ARRA funds’ in terms of their rationales regarding 
developing advanced energy as part of the larger U.S. energy policy. Thus, the dependent 
variable contained observations only for the number of patent applications in Alternative 
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Energy Production and Energy Conservation classifications (See Appendix A and 
Appendix B).  The number of patent applications included in the definition of Alternative 
Energy Production and the Energy Conservation were derived from the Public PAIR 
dataset provided by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).16  
Independent variables 
 The empirical model included factors that, on the basis of previous research, 
could be expected to influence levels of innovation activities in the energy technology 
field.  See Table 13 for a description and the source of each of the independent variables. 
These include (1) ARRA expenditure, (2) financial capacity, (3) electricity prices, (4) 
structure of electricity market, (5) knowledge stock, (6) circumstances that use renewable 
energy sources, (7) circumstances of state-energy policies, (8) political circumstances, 
and (9) economic characteristics 
 
  
                                                          
16  The data are available at (https://pairbulkdata.uspto.gov/).  
98 
 
Table 13. Variable Measurements  
Variables Measurements Data Source 
Dependent variable  
Innovation Activities in 
Energy Technologies 
1) Total number of patent applications 
counted in the Alternative Energy 
Production (Model 1) 
2) Total number of patent applications 
counted in the Energy Conservation 
(Model 2) 
3) Total number of patent applications (at 
individual level) counted in the 
classification identified in 1) Alternative 
Energy Production and 2) Energy 
Conservation of the Green Technology 
Classification (Model 3) 
 
 
 
United States Patent 
and Trademark 
Office(USPTO)’s 
Public PAIR Dataset 
Independent variable 
ARRA Funds 
Total amount of federal ARRA expenditures 
spent in 7 grant programs under the Office of 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(EERE), the lag length was used from one 
year to three years.  
Department of Energy 
Data Reported by the 
American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act 
(www.recovery.gov) 
Financial Capacity 1) Total amount of federal expenditures 
annually allocated by the Department of 
Energy 
2) Total amount spent under the federal 
DOE program through non-government 
funding participation 
USASPENDING. 
GOV 
(www.usasspending.gov) 
 
Electricity Price 
 
State’s average annual retail electricity price 
in residential, and industrial sectors 
(cents/KWH) 
U.S. Energy 
Information 
Administration (EIA) 
Structure 
of Electricity Market  
The presence of de-monopolized electricity 
market (1= presence, 0=otherwise) 
EIA 
Knowledge Stock 
 
Percentage of population over the age of 25 
with BA or higher   
U.S. Census Bureau 
Circumstances that Use 
RE Sources 
Number of establishments that use renewable 
energy resources (See Appendix C) 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Circumstances of State-
Energy Policies  
Duration of policy on the RPS, EERS, and 
EERPB 
DSIRE 
Political Circumstance 
 
1) Percentage of House seats occupied by 
Democrat at state level 
2) Percentage of Senate seats occupied by 
Democrat at the state level 
Multistate Associates 
Incorporated (MAI) 
Economic 
Characteristics 
Per Capita 
GDP 
Population  
 
 
1) Per Capita Real GDP adjusted in 2015 
dollars 
2) Number of whole population (1,000) 
 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
(BEA) 
Instrumental Variable 
ARRA Funds 
in Block Grant  
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
 
8) Total amount of federal ARRA 
expenditures spent under the CCDBG, 
CSBG and CDBG  
9) Number of percentage of unemployed 
from the sum of the employed and 
unemployed.  
 
Data Reported by the 
American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act 
(www.recovery.gov), 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
(https://www.bls.gov/)  
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 This study used federal government ARRA expenditures invested for motivating 
innovation of energy technologies.  The variable contained observations of the total 
amount spent in seven grant programs aimed to promote upgraded energy technologies 
under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) (See Table 14).  
Table 14.  Fiscal Decentralization Tools in the ARRA: Intergovernmental Grants 
DOE Office Grant Provision Grant Purpose 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Office of 
Energy 
Efficiency 
and 
Renewable 
Energy 
(EERE) 
1) Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Block Grants 
Grant for supporting energy conservation 
in the transportation, building, and other 
sectors and renewable energy 
development 
2) Weatherization Assistance Grant 
Program 
Grant for purchase of the energy efficient 
equipment for low income household 
3) State Energy Grant Program Grant for state-led energy initiatives. It 
was aimed to promote the energy 
efficiency and energy conservation.  
4) State Energy Efficient Appliance Rebate 
Grant 
Grant for the purchase of energy-
efficiency Energy Star products  
5) Advanced Battery Manufacturing Grants Grant for developing advanced battery 
and battery system 
6) Transportation Electrification Grants Grant for conducting demonstration 
(evaluation) on advanced electric drive 
vehicles technologies.  
7) Alternative-Fueled Vehicles Grants Grant for the purchase of alternative fuel 
and advance technology vehicles 
Source: Energy Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Retrieved from 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R40412.pdf  
 
 The overarching hypotheses was that the ARRA expenditures spent in 
intergovernmental grant programs and intended to support the energy technologies would 
be associated with increases in innovative activities in energy technologies. Indeed, this 
research employed ARRA expenditure’s lagged variables with length of three years to 
address the short-run and long-run effects of ARRA expenditures. It was represented in 
terms of the cumulative effects of the ARRA expenditures for the past three years. The 
database related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds was 
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collected from Department of Energy Data Reported by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (www.recovery.gov).  
 This research also included other explanatory variables: financial capacity, 
electricity circumstances, knowledge stock, circumstances that use renewable energy 
sources, circumstances of state-energy policies, political circumstance, and economic 
characteristics. The financial capacity of government was indicated by two types of 
annual expenditures by the federal government and non-government sources: (1) the total 
amount of federal expenditures allocated annually by the Department of Energy (DOE); 
and (2) the total amount of expenditures came from non-government sources. Federal 
DOE expenditure has been obligated annually under a rationale about stimulating 
innovative activities toward the sustainable energy resources (Executive Office of the 
President, 2016). It was implemented as a mandatory spending regimen over the long 
time regardless of enacting of Recovery Act funds. In this regard, this expenditures could 
be characterized as stable, and predictable funds of government. In the other hand, total 
amount from non-government resources was collected from total amount implemented 
within federal DOE program with non-government funding participation.  Non-
government expenditures were made based upon temporal contracts with provision of 
funds from the non-government sector over the short term.  These expenditures can be 
characterized as non-stable, unpredictable investments (Nemet & Kamman, 2007).   To 
determine determinants of innovation activities in energy technologies, these two 
different categories of expenditures were used to proxy for government financial capacity 
because there is reason to expect that they would lead to increases in innovation activities 
toward new energy technologies. The analysis assumed each effectiveness between 
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federal expenditure and non-government expenditures. The related data are gathered from 
an online database, USAspending.gov (www.usaspending.gov)17.   
 Previous research has shown that the determinants of innovative activity in energy 
technologies broadly include electricity circumstances. Thus, more specifically, 
electricity circumstances were observed with two attributes. Firstly, the states’ average 
annual electricity price in the residential and industrial sector was applied. This reflected 
the average annual retail electricity price. The data were collected by form EIA-861, 
which is the Annual Electric Power Industry Report of the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) at the state level.  Each observation was measured annually over 
the period of 2005 to 2015, and the units used were cents/kilowatt-hour.  All values were 
adjusted to 2015 values. Secondly, the analysis assumed that competition in electricity 
market may lead to more technological innovation related to energy.  In order to account 
for the electricity circumstance, this research used a variable reflecting the electricity 
market structure. Structure of electricity market was categorized within two groups: (1) 
group included both states with monopolized electricity market and states with suspended 
de-monopolized electricity market even if electricity restructuring law was enacted; (2) 
group included only states with de-monopolized electricity market.  States with the form 
of de-monopolized electricity market were coded ‘1’, States with the form of 
monopolized electricity market were coded ‘0’. States with suspended de-monopolized 
electricity market were also coded ‘0’.  
                                                          
17  www.usaspending.gov is established based on the Federal Funding Accountability and 
Transparency Act (FFATA) of 2006. Usaspending.gov is the most comprehensive database on government 
expenditures. 
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 The analysis assumed that the size of a state’s higher knowledge stock would 
influence its level of innovation activities. To measure the knowledge stock, this study 
used an indicator of educational attainment.  The proportion of 25 year olds and older 
with at least a bachelor’s degree was applied. Educational attainment data is available in 
the annual Current Population Survey at U.S. Census of Governments 
(https://www.census.gov/govs/).  
 In addition, this study expected that states with circumstances in which they used 
more renewable energy resources are more likely to have higher levels of innovation 
activities in energy technologies. The model included the number of establishments that 
used renewable energy resources in the electric power generation industries.  The 
industries that use wind, geothermal, biomass, and solar electric power generation were 
defined by the Economic Census under the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS).  This was recorded at the six digit NAICS level  within six sub-
categories (See Appendix C); (1) Hydroelectric power generation (NACIS 221111), (2) 
Solar electric power generation (NACIS 221114), (3) Wind industries (NACIS 221115), 
(4) Geothermal (NACIS 221116), (5) Biomass (NACIS 221117). Data was retrieved 
from the Census Bureau Economic.   
 Furthermore, this research expected that states with longer accumulated 
experience with policy implementation related to renewable and energy efficiency would 
be more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities in energy technologies. The 
model included three of the most important state-energy policies: Renewable Energy 
Portfolio Standards (RPS), Energy Efficiency Resources Standards (EERS) and Energy 
Efficiency Requirements for Public Buildings (EERPB). I included the difference 
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between the current year and the year of adoption. Data was retrieved from the Database 
of State Incentives for Renewable & Efficiency (DSIRE).   
 Next, previous research has shown that the presence of a political orientation of 
the Democratic are more likely to support to green technologies that are associated with 
the effect on the quality of the environment (Clark & Whitfor, 2011; Krause et al., 2014). 
Therefore, I expected states with higher percentages of House and Senate seats occupied 
by Democrats were more likely to have higher levels of technological innovation related 
to the energy.  The independent variable related to political circumstances was measured 
in terms of percentages of House and Senate seats occupied by Democrats.  
 Finally, this study specifically used state economic characteristics, including the 
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and population. All relevant numbers were 
adjusted for inflation and listed in 2015 dollars using the GDP deflator.  
Instrumental variables 
 The first instrumental variable was the unemployment rate. ARRA was intended 
to stimulate growth in economic performance and employment. Unemployment rates can 
be correlated with the level of ARRA funds allocated at the state level. However, 
unemployment rates are not directly related to innovation activities that foster new energy 
technologies. This research assumed that states with high unemployment rates would 
have spent more ARRA dollars to create more jobs.  
 The second instrumental variable was the total amount of federal ARRA funds 
spent in block grant programs aimed to provide federal grants to state or local 
governments.  Under the ARRA, block grant programs were designed to stimulate 
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innovation at the state and local levels (Conlan et al., 2017). The ARRA funding, through 
the block grant programs, increased rapidly over the time period of the ARRA (Dilger & 
Boyd, 2014).  State and local governments received $52.9 billion in the form of grant-in-
aid funds under the ARRA (Conlan et al., 2017, p.33). This funding was intended to 
reform federalism relationships as well as to reduce bureaucratic redundancy and cost 
(Terman & Feiock, 2014). What this research proposes is that the funding of the ARRA 
block grants was analogous to that of ARRA energy grants implemented through the 
EERE. Governments tend to pursue similar reforms (Urpelainem & Yang, 2017); 
therefore, when the ARRA energy funds were allocated under the decentralized 
framework for simulating energy innovation, they were so allocated as to mirror the 
funding of the block grants. Finally, also included in the second instrumental variable 
was the total amount spent under the Child Care and Development Block Grant 
(CCDBG) program18, the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG)19 program and 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program.20  
 For the instrument to be valid, I confirmed that the total amount of ARRA 
expenditures spent in the form of block grants, through the CCDBG, CSBG and CDBG, 
were highly correlated with the total amount of ARRA expenditures allocated within the 
decentralized networks under the DOE’s Office of EERE and Office, but not directly 
related to outcome of the innovation activities in energy technologies. The rate of 
unemployment was also correlated with the total amount of ARRA expenditures spent for 
                                                          
18  The program’s purpose was to provide for child care assistance for low-income families, it was 
implemented under the Department of Health and Human Services.   
19  The program’s purpose was to help to alleviate the causes and conditions of poverty in 
communities, it was implemented under the Department of Health and Human Services.  
20  The program’s purpose was to provide community development for affordable housing and anti-
poverty, it was implemented under the Department of Housing.  
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energy innovation (See Appendix E).  According to the results of the first stage with the 
instrumental variables, there was a strong positive association between the ARRA funds 
spent in the form of block grant and ARRA funds spent for energy technologies 
innovation within the decentralized networks. When ARRA energy funds were spent for 
energy innovation, there was a significant difference between states with higher rates of 
unemployment and those with lower rates of unemployment. Those states with higher 
unemployment had higher rates of ARRA funding for energy innovation. Thus, this 
research discovered that the potential drivers behind ARRA energy investment were the 
amount of ARRA funds spent in the form of block grants and the rate of unemployment.    
 In order to suggest validity of the instrumental variables, the week identification 
test was used based on the F-statistic (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The results of this test 
showed that the instrumental variables were strong. The F-statistic for the first-stage 
regression analysis was consistently much larger than 10 (Table 15). A test of 
overidentifying restrictions was performed in order to verify the validity of instrumental 
variables. The null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are valid was not rejected.   
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Table 15.  First-Stage Results with Instrumental Variables (IVs)  
Model 1 Coef. Std. Err P-value 
ARRA Funds Spent under the Block Grant Types 0.713*** 0.178 0.000 
Unemployment Rate 1.554*** 0.571 0.007 
ARRA Funds under the EERE  
One-year lag 0.860*** 0.042 0.000 
Two-year lag -0.128* 0.066 0.055 
Three-year lag -0.246*** 0.055 0.000 
Financial Capacity 
Federal DOE Expenditures 0.000 0.002 0.945 
Non-Government Expenditures -0.022 0.022 0.314 
Electricity Price 
Electricity Price in Residential Sector 0.892 0.643 0.166 
Electricity Price in Industrial Sector -1.231* 0.684 0.073 
De-Monopolized Electricity Market -0.058 1.634 0.972 
Knowledge Stock 0.098 0.150 0.515 
Circumstances that Use RE Sources 1.56e+04 1.28e+05 0.903 
Circumstances of State-Energy Policies 
RPS 0.190 0.164 0.248 
EERS 0.199 0.385 0.605 
EERPB -0.577 0.402 0.153 
Political Circumstance 
%House Seats occupied by Democrats 0.051 0.092 0.583 
% Senates occupied by Democrats -0.107 0.080 0.183 
Economic Characteristics 
Per Capita Real GDP 0.000 0.000 0.593 
Population (1,000) 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
Under-identification Test p-value 0.000 
Weak-identification Test (F-statistic) 32.102 
Over-identification Test of  instruments Test p-value 0.297 
Year FE YES 
Observation 539 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, p<0.01*** Dependent variable was total amount of ARRA expenditures spent 
in seven grant programs under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. 
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Results 
 Table 16 presents the relevant descriptive statistics for the states, excluding D.C. 
and Hawaii from 2005 to 2015. The number of patent applications combined in the 
Alternative Energy Production and the Energy Conservation ranged from 0 to 5535 with 
a mean of 200.063 and standard deviation of 494.352. The number of patent applications 
in the Alternative Energy Production ranged from 0 to 2184 with a mean of 82.033 and 
standard deviation of 239.755. The number of patent applications in Energy Conservation 
ranged from 0 to 3351 with a mean of 118.029 and standard deviation of 276.347. The 
ARRA grants spent in the seven grant programs administered by the Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) ranged from $0 to $2,109,441,787 with an 
average of $1,851,895 over the period. Next, the amount of federal expenditures allocated 
annually by the Department of Energy (DOE) ranged from $258,824 to $42,601,587,316 
with an average of $805,128,732 aggregated over the period of the study. The total 
amount spent within state DOE programs through non-governmental funding ranged 
from $0 to $3,405,072,313 with an average of $70,658,346 over the period of the study.   
 In terms of electricity price, states’ average annual retail electricity price in the 
residential sector ranged from 6.21 cent/kwh to 20.94cent/kwh with an average of 11.353 
cent/kwh. States’ average annual retail electricity price in the industrial sector ranged 
from 3.60 cent/kwh to 16.82 cent/kwh with an average of 7.17 cent/kwh. Also, 29% of 
the states had a de-monopolized electricity market. The percentage of the state’s 
population over age 25 with a BA degree or higher ranged from 15% to 40%, with a 
mean of 27.44%. The influence of industries that use renewable energy resources in 
electric power generation varied considerably, in the range of 0 to 348, with a mean of 
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30.15. In terms of circumstances of State-energy policies, the duration of the Renewable 
Portfolio Standards policy ranged from 0 to 19 with a mean of 3.363 year. The duration 
of Energy Efficiency Resource Standard policy ranged from 0 to14 with a mean of 1.196 
years, the duration of policy on Energy Efficiency Requirements for Public Buildings 
ranged from 0 to 12 with mean of 1.948 years. In regards to political support 
circumstances, the percentage of House seats occupied by Democrats ranged from 13% 
to 92% and the percentage of Senate seats occupied by Democrats from 7% to 96%, both 
with means of close to 50%.  Finally, in regards to economic characteristics, per capita 
GDP ranged from $$31,169 to $78,835 with a mean of $49,579; and population ranged 
from 514,157 to 39,288,180 with a mean of 6,273,252. As instrumental variables, the 
amount of ARRA grants spent through the CCDBG, CSBG, and CDBG ranged $0 to 
$674,560,200 with an average of $15,514,690 over the period. The rate of unemployment 
ranged from 2.4% to 13.7% with an average of 6.3%. 
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Table 16.  Descriptive Statistics  
 Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Innovation 
Activities  
 
Patent Applications counted in 
Alternative Energy Production 
and Energy Conservation  
200.063 494.352 0 5535 
Patent Applications counted in 
Alternative Energy Production  
82.033 239.755 0 2184 
Patent Applications counted in 
Energy Conservation 
118.029 276.347 0 3351 
ARRA Funds Total amount of federal ARRA 
expenditures spent in 7 grant 
programs under the Office of 
Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy (EERE)  
($10,000,000) 
18.518 36.167 0 210.9442 
Financial Capacity Federal Expenditures allocated 
by the DOE ($10,000,000) 
80.512 218.920 0.025 4260.159 
Total amount spent under the 
federal DOE program through 
non-government funding 
participation ($10,000,000)  
7.065 26.007 0 340.5072 
Electricity Price Electricity Price in Residential 
Sector (cents/kwh) 
11.353 3.032 6.21 20.94 
Electricity Price in Industrial 
Sector (cents/kwh) 
7.175 2.540 3.6 16.82 
Structure of 
Electricity Market  
Status of De-Monopolized 
Electricity Market 
0.293 0.455 0 1 
Knowledge Stock Percentage of BA or higher 27.440 4.963 15.1 40.4 
Circumstances that 
Use RE Sources 
Number of establishments that 
use renewable energy resources 
30.153 44.873 0 348 
Circumstances of 
State-Energy 
Policies  
Duration of RPS 3.363 5.039 0 19 
Duration of EERS 1.196 2.457 0 14 
Duration of EERPB 1.948 2.636 0 12 
Political 
Circumstances 
% House occupied by Democrats 48.399 17.371 13.333 92 
% Senates occupied by 
Democrats 
47.251 18.755 7.096 96.65 
Economic 
Characteristics 
Per Capita Real GDP ($) 49579.61 9672.184 31169 78835.42 
Number of Population (1,000)  6273.252 6862.072 514.157 39288.18 
ARRA Funds in 
Block Grants 
Total amount of federal ARRA 
expenditures spent under the 
CCDBG, CSBG and CDBG 
($10,000,000) 
1.551 5.298 0 67.456 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Number of percentage of 
unemployed from the sum of the 
employed and unemployed. 
6.318 2.168 2.4 13.7 
Note: N = 539 
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 Table 17 presented the results of the first difference model with instrumental 
variables allowing fixed effects. In the results of the test of endogeneity, this research 
presented the p-value of the endogeneity test, these results indicate that the error term in 
each model did not correlate with the ARRA funds. (Woolridge, 2003; Popp, 2016).   
 Table 17 presents the highly significant results of Model 2 (energy conservation) 
and Model 3 (alternative energy production and energy conservation) after an individual 
year of the ARRA funding. After a three-year period of ARRA expenses, these figures 
increased significantly, thereby suggesting the effectiveness of such funding. However, a 
negative impact occurred after two years because innovation does require a long time 
period for implementation. Thus, this research showed that innovative activities in energy 
technologies do bear fruit, but over time.   
 Table 17 also presented Model 1 (alternative energy production) as a weak trend 
toward significant in the first individual year; however, after three years, the ARRA 
funds had a highly significant impact, signaling that time is required for alternative 
energy production.  
 In the results of first differenced models, the ARRA funds had the largest 
cumulative effects on the innovative activities in the technologies of the alternative 
energy and the energy conservation, as well as combined categories, over the period of 
the ARRA. These results indicate that ten million dollars of additional government 
ARRA funds led to development in slightly more than 815,993 new energy technologies 
over five years.   
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 In addition, in Table 17, the second column for each model includes results 
assuming all variables are exogenous. These results were similar to those from the main 
first difference models. Also, in all of the statistical models, the year dummy variables for 
year specific effects showed that more energy technologies were generated in 2009 and 
2013 since the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was enacted in 2009. These 
results give us evidence of the effectiveness of Federal stimulus package under the 
ARRA of 2009.21 
  
  
                                                          
21  Autocorrelation had been checked through the Durbin-Watson statistic and did not find any 
problem in three different models. 
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Table 17.  Determinants of the Innovative Activities in Energy Technologies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  IV exog IV exog IV exog 
ARRA Funds under the EERE 
Individual year 1.428* 
(0.777) 
0.305 
(0.275) 
2.532*** 
(0.928) 
3.009*** 
(0.333) 
3.960*** 
(1.480) 
3.314*** 
(0.532) 
One-year lag 1.213*** 
(0.343) 
1.492*** 
(0.295) 
1.114*** 
(0.410) 
0.995*** 
(0.358) 
2.326*** 
(0.654) 
2.487*** 
(0.571) 
Two-year lag 0.284 
(0.421) 
0.099 
(0.408) 
-2.849*** 
(0.502) 
-2.770*** 
(0.495) 
-2.565*** 
(0.801) 
-2.671*** 
(0.490) 
Three-year lag 1.685*** 
(0.419) 
1.667*** 
(0.424) 
6.849*** 
(0.500) 
6.856*** 
(0.514) 
8.534*** 
(0.798) 
8.524*** 
(0.820) 
Financial Capacity 
Federal DOE 
Expenditures 
0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.023) 
Non-Government 
Expenditures 
-0.043 
(0.130) 
-0.067 
(0.131) 
-0.268* 
(0.156) 
-0.258 
(0.159) 
-0.311 
(0.249) 
-0.325 
(0.254) 
Electricity Price 
Electricity Price in 
Residential Sector 
-7.194 
(11.498) 
-5.181 
(11.558) 
13.701 
(13.726) 
12.846 
(14.014) 
6.507 
(21.893) 
7.664 
(22.365) 
Electricity Price in 
Industrial Sector 
-1.419 
(11.586) 
-4.460 
(11.551) 
-5.400 
(13.831) 
-4.108 
(14.005) 
-6.819 
(22.060) 
-8.568 
(22.351) 
De-Monopolized 
Electricity Market 
-12.072 
(10.762) 
-12.496 
(10.885) 
-19.782 
(12.848) 
-19.602 
(13.198) 
-31.854 
(20.491) 
-32.098 
(21.063) 
Knowledge Stock -1.492 
(0.978) 
-1.408 
(0.988) 
0.594 
(1.168) 
0.558 
(1.19) 
-0.899 
(1.863) 
-0.850 
(1.913) 
Circumstances that Use 
RE Sources 
1.46e+05   
(1.98e+06) 
4.20e+05   
(1.99e+06) 
1.37e+06 
(2.36e+06)   
1.25e+05 
(2.42e+06)   
1.51e+06 
(3.77e+06)   
1.67e+06 
(3.86e+06 )   
Circumstances of State-Energy Policies 
RPS 3.886 
(11.630) 
5.135 
(11.739) 
3.640 
(13.884) 
3.109 
(14.233) 
7.526 
(22.145) 
8.244 
(22.715) 
EERS -8.340 
(13.569) 
-10.224 
(13.673) 
-19.161 
(16.199) 
-18.360 
(16.578) 
-27.501 
(25.837) 
-28.585 
(26.458) 
EERPB 5.544 
(12.858) 
5.882 
(13.007) 
5.787 
(15.350) 
5.644 
(15.771) 
11.331 
(24.482) 
11.244 
(25.169) 
Political Circumstance 
%House Seats by 
Democrats 
-0.322 
(1.187) 
-0.247 
(1.200) 
-1.870 
(1.417) 
-1.902 
(1.455) 
-2.192 
(2.261) 
-2.149 
(2.323) 
% Senates by 
Democrats 
-0.005 
(0.980) 
-0.117 
(0.989) 
0.264 
(1.170) 
0.312 
(1.199) 
0.259 
(1.867) 
0.195 
(1.914) 
Economic Characteristics 
Per Capita Real 
GDP 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
Population (1,000) -0.036 
(0.056) 
-0.033 
(0.056) 
-0.017 
(0.067) 
-0.018 
(0.068) 
-0.053 
(0.107) 
-0.051 
(0.110) 
Cumulative Effects of 
ARRA  
4.609*** 
(0.907) 
3.562*** 
(0.608) 
7.645*** 
(0.848) 
8.090*** 
(0.738) 
12.255*** 
(1.727) 
11.653*** 
(1.177) 
Endogeneity Test P-Value 0.1477  0.1842  0.1574  
Observation 490 490 490 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, p<0.01* 
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Discussion 
 During 2008 and 2009 recession, the Obama administration used ARRA funds for 
macroeconomic purposes of helping to recover from the recession. A substantial amount 
of expenditure occurred at the state level, and was designed to stimulate green growth, 
create jobs and support energy technologies (Conlan et al., 2017). This research has 
focused that whether federal ARRA investments, designed to spur new technologies, 
toward alternative energy and energy conservation, effectively achieved their stated 
objectives. Specifically, the third essay focused on the evaluation of the cumulative 
effects of government ARRA funding as well as year by year spending. This research 
confirmed that cumulated ARRA expenditures made in grants through the Office of 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) led to higher levels of innovation 
activities in alternative energy and energy conservation. The results showed that the 
ARRA spending had a negative impact in the short-term (two-year after), but three years 
after, it led to positive impact on more innovation, in delayed returns toward 
technological energy activities. These results also support the proposition that 
technological innovation activities takes time.  
 As another notable finding, the results showed that innovation activities were 
strongly associated with lagged delayed effects of government investments. It is very 
noteworthy that temporary government funding evidently played a determinative role in 
directly stimulating more energy technology-related innovative activities, in cumulated 
returns, at the state level. The technology innovation process is complex and nonlinear, 
which occurs between the various stages of the process. It is also made up of many 
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institutions, including universities, start-ups, the federal government, and extra-national 
institutions, including the relationships between them. In this perspective, this research’s 
empirical evidence indicates that innovative activities may require extended timeframes 
for more productive return on government investment.   
 Also, one of the expectations was that state governments with larger magnitudes 
of non-government expenditures are more likely to have higher levels of innovation 
activities in energy technologies. Inconsistent with this expectation, this research found 
that states with greater amounts spent within government projects with non-government 
funding participation were associated with decreasing in innovation activities in energy 
technologies. Although it was a weak evidence toward significant in Model 1 (alternative 
energy production), these results lead readers to infer that technological innovation may 
be vulnerable to investments from temporal contracts with non-stable provision (Liang & 
Fiorino, 2013).  
 The statistically insignificant coefficients on several of the variables were 
unexpected on the basis of previous research, including financial capacity, electricity 
price, presence of de-monopolized electricity market, knowledge stock, the circumstances 
that use renewable resources, and the circumstance of state-energy policy, economic 
characteristics, and the impact of political ideology occupied by Democrats.  
 In regards to Federal DOE expenditures, empirical evidence indicates that the 
level of expenditures allocated by federal government did not have any relationship at all 
levels of innovation activities toward new energy technologies. However, it was 
estimated with the whole federal DOE budget. The whole federal DOE budget might not 
be enough as proxy for the expenditures, intended for energy technologies development.  
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 Early, the present study looked at higher electricity prices under the belief that 
they would lead to increases in research and patenting activities in energy area (Popp, 
2015)22. Stated differently, empirical evidence indicated that higher retail electricity 
prices were not associated with higher levels of innovation activities in energy 
technologies. Also, although the law enactment for the deregulating of the electricity 
market had been expected to accelerate technological innovation, this research’s finding 
showed that the presence of competitive electricity market did not have any relationship 
with innovation activities in energy technologies. Although the law enactment for the 
deregulating of the electricity market had been expected to accelerate technological 
innovation, this research showed that the presence of retail competition does not 
encourage innovation in the technologies of alternative energy and energy conservation.  
 In addition, another of expectations was that state governments with longer 
accumulated policies implementation experiences related to renewable and energy 
efficiency are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities toward new 
energy technologies.  Empirical result from this study has shown that the circumstances 
of state level-energy policies such as RPS, EERE, and EERPB did not have any 
relationship with innovation activities in energy technologies. From the two perspectives 
of demand pull and technology push, state level-energy policies such as RPS, EERE, and 
EERPB are more closely related to demand-pull strategies than technology-push 
strategies. Thus, the experience of RPS, EERE, and EERPB, that are targeted to 
renewable power’s generation or efficient equipment installation,  might not be 
                                                          
22  In the long run, a 10 percent increase in energy prices leads to a 3.5 percent rise in the number of 
energy patents. Most of the response occurs quickly after a change in energy prices 
(http://www.nber.org/reporter/2015number4/popp.html).  
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associated with the outcome of technology push strategies to boost the launch (or 
development) of new energy technologies.  
 This research’s results also provide empirical confirmation for a number of 
hypotheses related to state-specific economic characteristics. The fact that per capita 
GDP and population were insignificant on the innovation activities in three different 
models. In regard to knowledge stock variables, the results, in three different models, had 
shown that states with higher knowledge stock did not have any relationship with the 
higher levels of innovation activities related to energy technologies. Lastly, in all 
statistical model, the results indicate that state’ political circumstances occupied by the 
Democrats identification was not associated with higher rates of innovation activities in 
energy technologies. The greater presence of the firms that use renewable energy, also, 
were not associated with stimulating in innovation activities in energy technologies. 
Conclusion 
 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was the largest federal 
temporary investment as a one-time grant program. The ARRA investment, provided in 
seven grant programs through Office of energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, helped 
to motivate innovation activities in the alternative energy technologies and energy 
conservation technologies.  
 This study provides empirical results on the program’s effectiveness implemented 
under the fiscal decentralization framework. The ARRA relied on many programs being 
implemented quickly at the federal, state, and local levels as well as non-government 
entities level. These finding have implications that it is important that decentralized 
delivery system should be able to distribute the federal expenditure more efficiently for 
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promoting of innovation activities toward energy technologies in the future. This study 
also notes that the decentralization approach through intergovernmental grants among 
federal, state, and local level entities is essential as a new effective method in managing 
energy programs.  
 This analysis of the ARRA temporary expenditures shows clearly that short-term 
and temporary funding from the public sectors can provide a cumulative return on 
innovative energy activities, despite the previous theoretical scholarship that recognized 
only long-term and stable government funding positively affecting technological 
innovation. Although discontinuity public sectors’ spending might be disruptive to the 
achievement of longer term impact in the post-ARRA period, the empirical evidence 
certainly suggests that temporal expenditures, especially in the short-term, could be 
effective performance in terms of promoting energy innovation activities.  
 From this viewpoint, future research should include empirical study of whether 
short-term investment can be important for encouraging innovation technologies outcome 
distributed into the practical filed as patent publication in the post-ARRA period.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 What lessons can be extracted about the American Recovery Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA)’ funds that shaped the era of energy program and what do these lessons suggest 
about the role of energy policy toward the U.S. sustainable energy?  This three-essay 
dissertation sought to address these questions and, in doing so, empirically evaluate 
effectiveness of the energy programs that government had implemented in American 
Recovery Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Specifically, I first evaluated whether the ARRA 
energy efficiency expenditures substantially influenced levels of local government energy 
activities. In the second essay, I tested whether ARRA expenditures that aim to increase 
jobs were effective at motivating jobs creation in the energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sectors. In the final essay, I empirically evaluated the effects of the ARRA 
investments designed to spur new technologies, toward alternative energy and energy 
conservation, and effectively achieved their stated objectives.  All three essays in this 
dissertation provide answers to the questions whether they effectively achieved their 
stated objectives in regards energy policy field.  
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 The first essay showed that ARRA funds, expended with the stated intent of 
improving energy efficiency, actually helped local governments to make countless 
initiatives toward developing and adopting energy efficiency programs and policies. The 
competitive process for acquiring ARRA grants at the local level seems to have been an 
effective mechanism for the diffusion of more energy efficiency programs and policies, at 
least in the short term.  
 The second essay found that federal DOE funds allocated under the ARRA, to 
stimulate the new jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector, led to 
successful policy implementation. This research confirmed that cumulated ARRA 
expenditures allocated through State Energy Office (SEO) from federal EERE led to 
higher level of job creation in energy efficiency and renewable energy during the ARRA 
period. Although the results showed that the ARRA spending had a negative impact in 
the short-term (one-year after), these results had been matched the previous proposition 
that some states encountered more difficulties to implement ARRA funds which raised 
several intergovernmental challenges related to communication and administration 
(Carley & Hyman, 2014). Two years after, the ARRA funds led to positive impact on 
more job creation. This research’s results support that job creation activities require some 
time. It was strongly associated with delayed effects of government investment. 
 The third essay confirmed that the ARRA funds, implemented under the 
decentralized networks, successfully led to stimulate innovative activities in energy 
technologies within both categories of alternative energy and energy conservation. 
Another finding in third essay was that ARRA funds led to productive cumulative return 
on innovation activities toward alternative energy technologies and energy conservation 
120 
 
technologies during the period of ARRA. These findings has implications that it is 
important to inject a decentralization approach through intergovernmental grants 
regarding how government expenditures can more efficiently promote innovation 
activities in energy technologies. These accomplishments has indicated that temporary 
government investment evidently played a determinative role in directly stimulating more 
energy technology-related innovative activities.  
 In light of these findings, how should the national government’s energy policies 
improve with respect to investments in sustainable energy?.  This dissertation of the 
effects of government ARRA investment lends a number of insights into broader trends 
associated with the policies toward the energy sustainability.   First of all, to achieve 
sustainable energy, implementation of the grants under more competitive selection 
processes should be considered for an energy policy delivery system for the diffusion of 
more energy programs. Competing principals can lead to change the behavior of local 
governments as well as non-governmental entities. These process, in competitive grants, 
could be contributed to improve program quality and performance in order to provide 
more message on sustainable energy and services to the local community. 
 In addition, the implementation process based upon the competitive functions 
dependent on state and local agencies within the decentralization approach (Conlan et al., 
2017, p.7). This dissertation also gave meaningful attention to the ARRA funds 
implemented under the decentralized framework; these funds had important impact on 
achieving their stated goals during the period of ARRA. Thus, one can conclude, 
decentralized delivery system has a greater effect a new method in managing competitive 
grants to achieve sustainable energy.  
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 A second possible lesson is that the presence of the networked governance 
structure can be an effective implementation approach to have a higher level of 
innovation activities toward sustainable energy. The success of the ARRA funds relied on 
many projects being implemented quickly at the federal, state, and local as well as non-
government entities level. The ARRA functioned as a problem-solver that engaged with a 
wide range of federal, state and local partners. Decisions and implementation regarding 
energy programs under the networked governance structures had been allowed for greater 
flexibility and enhanced objectives which depend on some extent on state and local 
government’s perception. The independent authority of state and local governments led to 
more motivated actions or plans to match their unique circumstances, being more 
effectiveness toward sustainable energy than had been achieved at the national initiative. 
Therefore, this dissertation proposes that the effectiveness of federal programs depends 
on their function of managing through increasingly interdependent networks of federal, 
state, local nonprofit, and private entities. The collaborative networked governance can 
deliver significant performance advantages by enhancing the capacity to achieve 
sustainable energy.  Some actors who have no experiences working across boundaries 
should be required to realize their partnership’s potential for national goals (Conlan et al., 
2017).   
 A third possible lesson is that intergovernmental grants can serve as great devices 
for stimulating job creation and innovative technologies in the energy sector. 
Intergovernmental grants helped the delivery of complex national initiatives to numerous 
states, counties, cities, nonprofits, and private entities in energy programs under the 
ARRA. These implementations promoted the effectiveness of federal programs. The 
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presence of intergovernmental grants, that assume a bottom-up view of implementation, 
can provide a valid picture of energy program delivery.   
 Finally, the focus of this dissertation on the assessment of the rationale, design, 
implementation, and impacts of the ARRA offers opportunities to evaluate the 
effectiveness in the ARRA provisions. This dissertation provides empirical evidence of 
the effectiveness of ARRA funds spent, as one time and temporary expenditures 
according to their stated objectives. The finding of analyses from three different essays 
can contribute to the study of local and state government, as well as federal government’s 
role in sustainable energy policies. This dissertation can also contribute to policy 
adoption, implementation, evaluation literature focused on energy policy. As an 
extension of my dissertation, I propose empirical study of whether ARRA investment 
might be important for achieving long-term energy policy goals.  I also propose to find 
the policy instrument to enhance the overall effectiveness of energy policies. In addition, 
I propose to find how state government under the meta-governance mechanism can be 
engaged in promoting more energy efficiency continuously. Specifically, it will focus on 
the impact of the meta-governance mechanism, and whether there is continuation of the 
energy program after self-participation of sub-national level’s government under the 
ARRA.   
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Appendix A.  Definition of the Patents Related To Alternative Energy Production 
Classification 
of Green 
Technologies 
Description U.S. 
Class 
U.S. Subclass 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alternative  
Energy  
Production 
Agricultural Waste 44 589 
Biofuel 44 605, 589 
Chemical Waste 110 235~259, 346 
Domestic Hot Water Systems 126 634~680 
Passive Space Heating 52 173.3 
Swimming Pools 126 561~568 
Fuel Cell 429 12~46 
Fuel from Animal Waste 44 605 
Gasification 48 197A, 197R 
Genetically Engineered Organism 435  252.3, 252.35, 254.9 
 254.11, 257.2,  
257 325~408, 410~431 
Geothermal 60 641.2~641.5 
436 25~33 
Harnessing Energy from man-made waste 75 958 
431 5 
Hospital Waste 110 235~259, 346 
Hydroelectric  405 76~78 
60 495~507 
Industrial Waste 110 235~259, 346 
Industrial Waste Anaerobic Digestion 210 605 
Industrial Wood Waste 44 589~606 
Inertial (Turbine) 290 51~54 
60 495~507 
Landfill Gas 431 5 
Municipal Waste 44 552 
Nuclear Power : Induced Nuclear Reactions, 
processes 
376 - 
Nuclear Power : Reaction Motor with electric  60 203.1 
Nuclear Power : Heating motive fluid by nuclear 
energy 
60 644.1 
Nuclear Power Photovoltaic 136 243~265 
Refuse derived fuel 44 552 
Solar Cells 438 57,82,84~86,90,93~94, 
96, 97 
Solar Energy 126 561~714 
320 101 
Solar Thermal Energy 126 561~713 
60 641.8 ~641.15 
Water Level (Wave or Tide) 405 76~78 
60 495~507 
Wind 290 44, 55 
307 64~66, 82~87 
415 2.1 
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office. USPTO Green Technology Pilot Program, Retrieved from 
http://www.waybetterpatents.com/green_pilot_classes.html  
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Appendix B.  Definition of the Patents Related To Energy Conservation 
Classification 
of Green 
Technologies 
Description U.S. 
Class 
U.S. Subclass 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Energy 
Conservation 
Alternative-Power Vehicle 180 2.1, 2.2, 54.1 
Cathode Ray Tube Circuits 315 150, 151 
Commuting – HOV, Teleworking 705 13 
105 1.1, 1.3 
Drag Reduction 105 1.1~1.3 
296 180.1~180.5, 181.5 
Electric Lamp & Discharge Devices 313 498~512, 567~643 
Electric Vehicle 180 65.1, 65.21 
320 109 
701 22 
310 1~310 
Emission Trading (Pollution Credits) 705 35~45 
Energy Storage & Distribution 307 38~41 
700 295~298 
713 300~340 
Fuel Cell Powered Vehicles 180 65.21, 65.31 
Human-Powered Vehicle 180 205 
280 200~304.5 
Hybrid-Powered Vehicle 180 65.21 
73 35.01~35.13 
73 112~115 
73 116~119A 
73 121~132 
Incoherent Light Emitter Structure 257 79, 82, 88~90, 93, 
99~103 
Land Vehicle – Electric Trains 105 49~71 
Land Vehicle – Electric Cars 180 65.1~65.8 
Optical Systems and Elements 359 591~598 
Roadway – Recycled Surface, All Weather 
Bikeways 
404 32~46 
Static Structure 52 309.1~309.17 
52 404.1~404.5 
52 424~442 
52 783.1~795.1 
Thermal 702 130~136 
Transportation 361 19,20,141,152, 218 
Watercraft Drive (Electric Powered) 440 6~7 
Watercraft Drive (Human Powered) 440 21~32 
Wave-Powered Boat Motors 440 9 
Wind-Powered Boat Motors 440 8 
Wind-Powered Ships 114 102.1~115 
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office. USPTO Green Technology Pilot Program, Retrieved from 
http://www.waybetterpatents.com/green_pilot_classes.html  
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Appendix C.  Establishment that Use Renewable Energy Resources in Electric 
Power Generation 
NAICS Description 
221111 Hydroelectric power generation 
221114 Solar Electric power generation 
221115 Wind industries 
221116 Geothermal 
221117 Biomass 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Economic Data 
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Appendix D.  Cross-Correlation Analysis in Second Essay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1)ARRA_EERE 1.000            
(2)ARRA_EERE (t-1) 0.794 1.000           
(3)ARRA_EERE(t-2) 0.469 0.791 1.000          
(4)ARRA_EERE(t-3) 0.206 0.533 0.875 1.000         
(5)Federal DOE budget -0.025 -0.028 -0.028 -0.0295 1.000        
(6)Non-Government funds -0.009 -0.008 -0.030 -0.029 0.028 1.000       
(7)Democratic Governor -0.032 0.001 0.036 0.033 0.035 0.011 1.000      
(8) RE Sources 0.348 0.224 0.120 0.226 -0.001 -0.028 -0.092 1.000     
(9) Per Capita Real GDP -0.074 -0.087 -0.081 -0.054 -0.007 -0.020 -0.095 0.050 1.000    
(10) Population Density 0.135 0.139 0.143 0.130 -0.005 0.059 -0.091 0.140 0.327 1.000   
(11)ARRA in the Block Grant 0.505 0.609 0.614 0.485 -0.017 -0.020 -0.006 0.000 -0.041 0.112 1.000  
(12)State Energy Policies 0.235 0.372 0.523 0.538 -0.038 -0.028 -0.078 0.296 -0.040 0.163 0.234 1.000 
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Appendix E.  Cross-Correlation Analysis in Third Essay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1)ARRA_EERE 1.00                    
(2)ARRA_EERE (t-1) 0.79 1.00                   
(3)ARRA_EERE (t-2) 0.46 0.79 1.00                  
(4)ARRA_EERE (t-3) 0.20 0.53 0.87 1.00                 
(5)Federal DOE annual 
budget 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 1.00                
(6)Non-Government funds -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 1.00               
(7)Electricity Price in 
Industrial  
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 1.00              
(8)Electricity Price in 
Residential 
0.15 0.19 0.24 0.24 -0.02 -0.06 0.88 1.00             
(9)De-Monopolized 
Electricity  
-0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.17 0.20 1.00            
(10)Knowledge Stock 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.08 -0.00 -0.01 0.23 0.24 0.40 1.00           
(11) RE Sources 0.34 0.22 0.12 0.23 -0.00 -0.03 0.12 0.25 0.02 0.07 1.00          
(12) RPS  0.11 0.19 0.28 0.29 0.03 -0.07 0.27 0.42 0.11 0.14 0.18 1.00         
(13) EERS 0.23 0.37 0.52 0.54 -0.04 -0.03 0.17 0.33 0.04 0.12 0.30 0.39 1.00        
(14) EERPB 0.33 0.43 0.50 0.46 -0.04 0.02 0.18 0.36 -0.01 0.09 0.27 0.44 0.79 1.00       
(15)%House Seats by 
Democrats 
0.08 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.40 0.42 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.25 0.15 0.23 1.00      
(16)% Senates Seats by 
Democrats 
0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.40 0.37 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.88 1.00     
(17) Per Capita Real GDP -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.43 0.35 0.19 0.26 0.05 0.15 -0.04 -0.03 0.15 0.20 1.00    
(18) Population 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.42 -0.02 0.01 0.09 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.50 0.13 0.42 0.38 0.12 0.05 0.12 1.00   
(19)ARRA in the Block 
Grant Types 
050 0.61 0.61 0.49 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.16 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 0.11 0.23 0.32 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.34 1.00  
(20)Unemployment Rate 0.59 0.50 0.29 0.14 -0.04 0.04 0.10 0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.26 0.07 0.13 0.27 0.27 0.16 -0.28 0.23 0.28 1.00 
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